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Synopsis 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine liquidity across several 
market structures.  The research provides empirical evidence on increasingly 
significant issues given the rapid increase in structural changes across 
international equity markets.  Each essay addresses some inconclusive research 
in order to aid researchers, investors and regulators in the course of 
understanding and managing the liquidity provision of various market 
structures. 
The first essay analyzes liquidity surrounding earnings announcements on the 
Italian Bourse.  Studies of market reaction surrounding earnings announcements 
use bid-ask spreads to proxy for information asymmetry.  It is proposed that the 
use of spreads posted by NYSE specialists or Nasdaq dealers is problematic in 
previous tests since dealer spreads reflect the market power of dealers.  This 
essay addresses these problems by examining bid-ask spreads surrounding 
earnings announcements for stocks that trade in a purely order-driven 
environment.  The problems encountered in previous studies are mitigated.  The 
results indicate that bid-ask spreads increase significantly around earnings 
announcements, reflecting an increase in information asymmetry in contrast to 
previous studies using daily data from US markets. 
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The second essay analyzes liquidity across auction and specialist market 
structures.  Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the 
NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on Nasdaq.  However, the hybrid nature 
of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist and a limit order book, 
clouds the comparison.  In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the 
Italian Bourse, which provides a cleaner experiment for examining this issue.  
Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, 
where the specialist controls the order book.  Results indicate that spreads 
tighten when stocks move to the specialist market.  This reduction in spreads is 
robust to market capitalization, industry affiliation and different observation 
periods around the structural change.  The specialist’s ability to offer price 
improvement further lowers the cost of executing trades.  Specialist market 
structures are more advantageous to market participants. 
The final essay analyzes intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads across auction and 
specialist market structures.  Several studies have analyzed liquidity across a 
trading day, and have documented that bid-ask spreads exhibit a U-shaped 
pattern, with spreads wider at the start and end of the trading day, whilst spreads 
are tighter in the middle of the day.  This pattern has been attributed to 
inventory holding costs, the specialist’s market power and adverse selection 
risk.  The structural change on the Italian Bourse provides a natural experiment 
where intraday patterns in spreads across different market structures can be 
compared.  Results indicate that volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads exhibit 
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the U-shaped intraday pattern both before and after the structural change.  While 
time-weighted spreads are consistently higher throughout the trading day under 
the specialist structure, the specialists ability to offer price improvement within 
the best quotes results in the ‘real’ cost of trading being lower under a specialist 
system.  These results are robust to the size of the firm, the event window 
around the structural change, as well as overall market-wide changes. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Overview 
 
The liquidity of any market, particularly a stock market, is a fundamental factor 
in the design of any stock exchange.  Individual and institutional investors both 
prefer liquid markets that offer low trading costs and can absorb large orders 
without severe price penalties.  The provision of liquidity has been central to 
much interest from both academics and market regulators.  As the organization 
of trading directly affects the provision of liquidity to market participants, 
understanding the structure of a market, and the ‘real’ costs of trading in the 
market, is imperative.  The primary objective of this dissertation is to 
thoroughly explore the liquidity of various market structures via thorough 
analysis of bid-ask spreads. 
 
The various types of market structures in place worldwide, and the ever-
changing structure within many already established markets, has lead to 
significant amounts of academic research.  The introduction and proliferation of 
the limit order book alongside the specialist on the NYSE has driven research 
attempting to decipher if the limit order book has benefited market participants.  
This research has progressed to determining if removal of the specialist, leaving 
the limit order book as the sole provider of liquidity, is the optimal structure.  
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Also, comparisons across market structures have attracted the interest of many 
academics.  For example, comparing the dealer market of Nasdaq to the hybrid 
structure of the NYSE, has been central to much of this research. 
 
This dissertation brings further evidence to bear on the liquidity of various 
market structures.  Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive review of all literature 
pertaining to the area, and ultimately develops several hypotheses that will 
subsequently be tested in the three essays which comprise this dissertation.  The 
first essay analyzes the variation in liquidity caused by earnings announcements 
for the largest stocks trading in a pure order-driven environment on the Italian 
Bourse.  The structural change implemented on the Italian Bourse, in which 
several stocks that originally traded in an auction market switched to a specialist 
market structure, motivate the remainder of the thesis.  In particular, the second 
essay directly compares bid-ask spreads for several stocks before and after the 
structural change in an attempt to determine which structure offers optimal 
liquidity.  The final essay compares the intraday pattern of liquidity across 
auction and specialist market structures. 
 
1.2 Bid-Ask Spreads Around Earnings Announcements 
 
The study of market reactions surrounding earnings announcements raises 
questions concerning information asymmetry and the relationship between 
private and public information in securities markets.  Arguing the two are 
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substitutes, Morse and Ushman (1983) and Bushman, Dutta, Hughes and 
Indjejikian (1997) suggest that if public announcements discourage private 
information gathering, earnings announcements could coincide with lower 
information asymmetry.  However, if some investors can acquire private 
information by processing public announcements, private and public 
information could be complementary, increasing information asymmetry 
surrounding earnings announcements (see Indjejikian, 1991; Harris and Raviv, 
1993; Kim and Verrecchia, 1991, 1994). 
 
Empirical research has focused on this issue directly by examining bid-ask 
spreads surrounding earnings announcements.  Spreads are commonly 
considered a proxy for information asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), 
with increased spreads surrounding earnings announcements consistent with an 
increase in information asymmetry.  The evidence from empirical studies is 
inconclusive.  Most studies find no evidence of significant changes in bid-ask 
spreads surrounding earnings announcements, despite evidence that the adverse 
selection component of the spread widens significantly surrounding earnings 
announcements.1 
 
In the first essay, I propose that the inconclusive evidence is related to the use of 
spreads posted by NYSE specialists or Nasdaq dealers in prior studies.  Dealer 
spreads confound a number of factors, potentially clouding the examination of 
                                                 
1
 See Morse and Ushman, 1983; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Lee, Mucklow and Ready, 1993; Brooks, 1994; 
Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Affleck-Graves, Callahan and Chipalkatti, 2002. 
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information asymmetry surrounding earnings announcements.  The first essay 
thus addresses this problem by examining bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings 
announcements for stocks listed on the Italian Bourse.  Since the stocks 
examined trade in a purely order-driven environment, the problems encountered 
in previous studies are mitigated.  This enables a cleaner test of information 
asymmetry surrounding earnings announcements.   
 
1.3 Bid-Ask Spreads Under Auction and Specialist Market Structures 
 
Stock exchanges worldwide implement various methods of trading equity 
securities.  Each exchange has a set of rules that dictate how orders are 
submitted, who handles and processes these orders, and ultimately how prices 
are set (O’Hara, 1995).  The organization of trading directly affects the 
provision of liquidity to market participants.  Individual and institutional 
investors both prefer liquid markets that offer low trading costs and can absorb 
large orders without severe price penalties.  The provision of liquidity has been 
central to much interest from both academics and market regulators.  In 
particular, comparing specialist markets (such as the NYSE) with other market 
structures (such as the dealer structure of Nasdaq) to determine which offers 
optimal liquidity is of significant practical importance.  The second essay 
investigates the variation in liquidity caused by the change from an auction 
market to a specialist market on the Italian Bourse. 
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Almost all research on liquidity comparisons is US based.  The overwhelming 
majority of studies find that a specialist market results in lower costs of trading 
compared to a dealer market.  Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994), Huang 
and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) compare the 
magnitude of bid-ask spread components for NYSE / AMEX stocks to Nasdaq 
stocks.  They show that execution costs are lower for NYSE / AMEX listed 
companies, regardless of capitalization.  They also find that adverse selection is 
not causing the wider spreads on Nasdaq.2 
 
Christie and Huang (1994) and Barclay (1997) examine if structurally induced 
changes in trading costs occur when firms relocate from a dealer market to a 
specialist market.  Their results confirm that the move away from Nasdaq leads 
to a significant reduction in bid-ask spreads.3  Amidst these studies finding 
lower costs on the NYSE (and AMEX), several studies find that execution costs 
are lower on Nasdaq.  Dubofsky and Groth (1984) and Cooper, Groth and 
Avera (1985) find that the highest liquidity exists for Nasdaq stocks.  Chan and 
Lakonishok (1997) show that the cost of trading in small firms is lower on 
Nasdaq, while the NYSE provides better execution for larger firms. 
 
                                                 
2
 Neal (1992) compares the bid-ask spread for options on AMEX, which operate a specialist structure and the 
Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE), which operate a competitive market maker structure.  He finds that when 
trading volume is low, the specialist structure provides more liquidity, although the benefit decreases when 
trading volume increases. 
3
 Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) find that specialist intervention improves liquidity for the most illiquid stocks 
on the Italian Stock Exchange. 
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While these studies are comparing liquidity across exchanges, the exact nature 
of the comparison is unclear.  Nasdaq is a ‘competitive’ dealer market, 
employing several market makers for each security.  The NYSE, however, is 
ambiguous.  Brock and Kleidon (1992) describe specialists on the NYSE as 
monopolistic market makers.  Huang and Stoll (1996) describe the NYSE as an 
auction market that employs a specialist for each security.  Affleck-Graves, 
Hedge and Miller (1994, p1473) describe the specialist as “enjoying an 
exclusive franchise to make a market in a listed stock and to manage the book of 
public limit orders”.  The adoption of a limit order book to provide additional 
liquidity is considered as competition to the specialist (Glosten, 1994).  Overall, 
the exact nature of trading on the NYSE cannot be classified as a single, 
definitive market structure. 
 
Demsetz (1997) argues that the limit order book alongside the specialist makes 
comparisons using the NYSE difficult.  In particular, customer limit orders can 
obscure the link between observed bid-ask spreads and the costs of market 
making.  Bid and ask quotes could reflect supply and demand conditions of 
investors rather than the inventory, order processing and adverse selection 
components of professional market makers.  This is confirmed by Kavajecz 
(1999) who finds that public limit orders are represented in about 64 percent of 
NYSE specialists’ quotes, and Ross, Shapiro and Smith (1996) who report that 
limit orders account for 65 percent of all executed orders.  This, as Demsetz 
(1997, p92) clearly states, “… must yield an average NYSE spread that, for 
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similar stocks, is smaller than on the Nasdaq”.  Thus comparing bid-ask spreads 
on the NYSE and Nasdaq can be misleading as spreads on the NYSE do not 
accurately represent the costs of making a market. 
 
This hybrid nature of trading on the NYSE makes comparing liquidity across 
dealer and specialist markets ambiguous.  For the second essay, I have access to 
a dataset that allows an accurate comparison between two market structures.  On 
2 April, 2001, a specialist segment was introduced on the Italian Bourse.  Stocks 
that originally traded in an auction market commenced trading in a specialist 
market.  This specialist, rather than competing with the limit order book, 
receives all orders and decides whether to execute these against his or her own 
inventory, or to post them in a limit order book which they control.  
 
In addition to this ‘clean’ experimental design, I directly test for the advantages 
of a specialist market over an auction market.  The majority of stock exchanges 
worldwide are organized as auction markets.  Glosten (1994) proposes that 
traders will benefit from a completely open electronic limit order book.  This is 
an indirect claim that an order-driven auction system is more advantageous to 
market participants compared to the specialist market currently used by the 
NYSE.  Examining the benefits (or costs) of moving between the most 
commonly used market structure and a specialist market is of immediate 
practical importance.  Finally, over the transition period, a third market segment 
on the Italian Bourse continued trading as normal.  I am thus able to ascertain 
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the exact impact on liquidity of relocating from an auction market to a specialist 
market, while controlling for overall market changes with the third market 
segment. 
 
1.4 The Intraday Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads Across Auction and 
Specialist Market Structures 
 
The provision of liquidity for a stock market is a primary consideration for 
regulators and participants, and is particularly of interest to academic 
researchers.  Understanding how liquidity varies throughout a trading day has 
been a central objective of much of this research.  Many studies have analyzed 
bid-ask spreads for stock markets worldwide, and have found time-varying 
spreads, caused by a myriad of factors.  This variation has been described as U-
shaped, in which spreads are wider at the open and close of trading, whilst they 
are tighter in the middle of the trading day. 
 
This U-shaped pattern has been attributed to three main factors: inventory 
holding costs, specialist market power and adverse information.  The inventory 
based models (Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll, 1981) 
argue that the spread exists to compensate inventory risk.  Specifically, the 
market maker adjusts his bid and ask quotes to restore inventory imbalances.  
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) find that bid-ask spreads widen in response to 
higher trading volume.  Madhavan and Smidt (1993) show that quote revisions 
 16 
are related to order imbalances.  Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) find that trades 
involving NYSE specialists have larger spreads.  The increased volume at the 
open and close of trading leads to greater order imbalances, and thus the U-
shaped pattern in spreads. 
 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) claim that specialists on the NYSE are monopolistic 
market makers.  As transaction demand is greater and less elastic at the open 
and close of trading due to overnight information, and fund managers 
concentration of trading near the close, a market maker can discriminate during 
these periods by charging higher prices.  Their model thus predicts periodic 
demand with high volumes and wide spreads, thus resulting in the U-shaped 
intraday pattern. 
 
Information based models, including Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992), Hasbrouck 
(1988), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990, 1994) 
and Madhavan (1992) focus on the adverse selection risk faced by market 
makers as the cause of the spread.  As specialists are at an informational 
disadvantage, they must keep their spreads sufficiently wide to ensure that gains 
made from trading with the uninformed more than offset losses made when 
trading with the informed.  As information asymmetry is most likely at the start 
and end of a trading day, the spreads are widest at the open and close of trading 
(and thus the U-shaped pattern exists). 
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The ambiguous nature of trading on the NYSE, which consists of both a 
specialist and a limit order book, make attributing the observed intra-day 
patterns to specialist specific behavior difficult.  In particular, as Demsetz 
(1997) argues, customer limit orders can obscure the link between observed bid-
ask spreads and the costs of market making.  Bid and ask quotes could reflect 
supply and demand conditions of investors rather than the inventory, order 
processing and adverse selection components of professional market makers.  
The U-shaped pattern in bid-ask spreads could then be an aggregation of both 
specialist and public traders intraday behavior. 
 
For the final essay, I have access to a dataset that allows an accurate comparison 
between two market structures.  On 2 April, 2001, a specialist segment was 
introduced on the Italian Bourse.  Stocks that originally traded in an auction 
market commenced trading in a specialist market.  This specialist, rather than 
competing with the limit order book, receives all orders and decides whether to 
execute these against his or her own inventory, or to post them in a limit order 
book which they control.  This allows a direct comparison of spreads driven by 
public limit order traders in an auction market with spreads driven by a 
specialist.  As the specialist is effectively a monopolist, I also directly test for 
how specialists use their market power throughout the trading day. 
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1.5 Summary 
 
The three essays in this dissertation provide evidence regarding the behavior of 
bid-ask spreads on the Italian Bourse.  This chapter motivates each essay by 
illustrating the importance of this evidence to both academics and practitioners 
faced with a litany of inconclusive literature in an area of ever growing 
importance. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, prior 
literature pertaining to the measurement and behavior of bid-ask spreads for 
various stock exchanges worldwide is reviewed.  Also included is a thorough 
discussion on the evolution of the Italian Bourse, especially the transition from 
an auction market to a specialist market for several stocks.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
present the three essays discussed in this chapter.  Each essay contains sections 
describing the data and sample, research design, empirical results, additional 
tests and conclusions reached.  Chapter 6 concludes by highlighting how the 
evidence presented in this dissertation can be used by academics and 
practitioners to help understand bid-ask spreads under various market structures. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Worldwide exchanges trading equity securities follow sets of rules which 
regulate how orders are submitted, who handles and processes these orders, and 
ultimately how prices are set (O’Hara, 1995).  The differing organization of 
trading directly influences the provision of liquidity to market participants.  
Individual and institutional investors both prefer liquid markets that offer low 
trading costs and can absorb large orders without severe price penalties.  It is 
this liquidity provision that has been central to much interest from both 
academics and market regulators.   
 
Specifically, the main objective of this dissertation is to examine the magnitude 
and behavior of specialist intervention with regards to liquidity on the Italian 
Bourse.  This chapter provides an extensive review of the literature pertaining to 
specialist, dealer and auction market structures.  However, the wide-ranging 
literature almost always compares a specialist market with a dealer market (i.e. 
NYSE versus Nasdaq).  The comparison of pure specialist markets with pure 
auction markets is effectively non-existent.  This dissertation is thus the first 
direct comparison of specialist markets with an auction market structure to 
determine which offers optimal liquidity on the Italian Bourse.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2.1 outlines 
empirical research focused on bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings 
announcements.  Section 2.2 presents a thorough review of literature, but with a 
tighter focus on particular bid-ask spreads issues.  Section 2.2.1 adopts an 
international perspective, describing how spreads vary across markets. Section 
2.2.2 details previous studies which have focused on the intraday analysis of the 
bid-ask spread pattern.  Section 2.3 presents a thorough account of the 
institutional detail on the Italian Bourse.  It commences with the market 
structure prior to the 2001 structural changes.  Details of the structural change, 
and thus the new trading specifications, are then discussed.  Section 2.4 
summarizes this chapter. 
 
2.1 Earnings Announcements 
 
The bid-ask spread surrounding earnings announcements is used as a proxy for 
analyzing the information asymmetry in an auction market.  Spreads are 
commonly considered a proxy for information asymmetry (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985), with increased spreads surrounding earnings announcements 
consistent with an increase in information asymmetry.  Most studies find no 
evidence of significant changes in bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings 
announcements, despite evidence that the adverse selection component of the 
spread widens significantly surrounding these announcements (see Morse and 
Ushman, 1983; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Lee, Mucklow and Ready, 1993; 
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Brooks, 1994; Krinsky and Lee, 1996; Affleck-Graves, Callahan and 
Chipalkatti, 2002). The inconclusive evidence from prior studies is unsurprising 
given the focus on spreads posted by dealers on the NYSE and Nasdaq.   
 
McInish and Wood (1995) analyze hidden limit orders on the NYSE.  
According to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) policy and 
rules, it is necessary to display the best bid and ask, but in contrast the specialist 
has significant freedom to set the price (NYSE Rule 60, 1991).  Hasbrouck and 
Sosebee (1992) observe that quotes posted from specialists are representative, 
and there is not any mechanism that shows these quotes automatically and in 
real time. 
 
Stemming from this is the notion of ‘price improvement’, which occurs when a 
market order is executed at the detriment of a hidden limit order (Figure 2-1). 
However, this improvement is just illusory if it is measured in relation to the 
best quoted bid and ask, and not relative to the inside bid-ask spread (i.e. the 
effective spread). 
 
Analyzing a sample of stocks from TORQ (NYSE), McInish and Wood (1995) 
distinguish hidden orders from shown orders on the basis of posting and 
execution times.  The descriptive statistics reveal large frequencies of hidden 
limit orders, representing those orders at a price inside the current best bid and 
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ask that will not be displayed to the market (creating disadvantages to 
investors).   
 
Figure 2-1 
Price-Improvement of a Hidden Limit Order for a NYSE Stock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dealer spreads are widely known to reflect order processing and inventory 
holding costs (transitory components) as well as adverse selection costs (which 
derive from information asymmetry, and are considered a permanent 
component).  Nasdaq is a dealer market, where the absence of a limit order book 
and the presence of several dealers for a single stock creates high competition.  
The results show a tacit collusion between dealers who compete on Nasdaq to 
post even-eighth quotes, but avoid odd-eighth quotes.  Christie and Schultz 
(1994) show that 70 percent of the Nasdaq sample exhibit an absence of odd-
eighth quotes.  Misuse of market power by dealers – for example by avoiding 
odd-eighth quotes – has been shown to artificially inflate posted spreads (see 
Specialist 
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also Harris, 1991).  Therefore, dealer spreads could be contaminated by the 
market power (and anti-competitive behavior) of dealers. 
 
Figure 2-2 
Possible Clouding Effect for Competitive Quotes 
 
 
 
Analyzing Figure 2-2, a dealer posts the best bid and ask for a generic stock at 
time t.  At the same time he or she does not show the competitive inside bid and 
ask (true values), which has a tighter spread than the one posted.  Suppose that 
in t+1, the dealer posts the same bid and ask, and the market volatility increases 
due to the release of price-sensitive information, implying an increase of the 
inside spread. This effect is not likely to be captured from the quote data used in 
previous studies. 
 
Studies examining the components of the bid-ask spread mitigate this problem 
by focusing on the adverse selection component.  However, doubt remains as to 
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the accuracy of spread decomposition methods (see Van Ness, Van Ness and 
Warr, 2001).   After the Christie and Schultz (1994) study, Nasdaq dealers 
changed their behavior, frequently adopting odd-eight quotes. (The paper was 
published on 24 May, 1994 and on 26 / 27 May, 1994; the number of dealers 
posting quotes solely in even-eights declined rapidly).  
 
Currently the Nasdaq quote system is in sixteenth.  As of January 2002, Nasdaq 
adopted the Supermontage system.  The structure proposed in Supermontage 
divides the order book into separate classes, and establishes price over time 
priority, thus threatening the ability of new entrants to compete.  For example, 
as in Figure 2-3(a), an ECN (similar to an electronic limit order book), charged 
an access fee, enters an order in PDLI that betters the NBBO (National Best Bid 
and Offer).  A market maker then enters a similarly priced order, as in Figure 2-
3(b). 
Figure 2-3(a) 
Example of a Limit Order Book 
 
Stock Bid Ask 
PDLI 92 92-1/2 
ECN1 92 95 
MM1 91-1/2 93 
MM2 91-1/2 93 
ECN2 90 92-1/2 
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Figure 2-3(b) 
Example of a Market Maker Posting Bids and Asks 
 
Stock Bid Ask 
PDLI 92 92-1/2 
MM1 92 93-1/2 
ECN1 92 95 
 
Under the Supermontage algorithm, the market makers’ order takes precedence 
(going to the top of the order book).  This structure establishes prima facie that 
Nasdaq market makers are granted a right of first refusal in competition with 
ECNs and other markets. 
 
Further, the study of market reaction surrounding earnings announcements 
raises questions concerning information asymmetry and the relationship 
between private and public information in securities markets.  Morse and 
Ushman (1983) and Bushman, Dutta, Hughes and Indjejikian (1997) support the 
“substitute” hypothesis where public announcements discourage private 
information gathering.  Earnings announcements could coincide with lower 
information asymmetry, implying an increase in market liquidity surrounding 
the price-sensitive information.  The decrease of liquidity in the market due to 
the presence of discretionary liquidity traders does not necessarily indicate 
evidence of price-sensitive information, creating more private information (i.e. 
more information asymmetry).  However, some investors can quickly process 
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public information, increasing the level of private information.  This results in 
private and public information being complementary, increasing information 
asymmetry surrounding earnings announcements (see Indjejikian, 1991; Harris 
and Raviv, 1993).   
 
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that some market participants process 
earnings announcements into private information about a firm’s performance.  
These traders are capable of informed judgments from public sources and can 
be thought of as market experts.  Through their activities, information is quickly 
impounded into prices.  Alternatively, an earnings release motivates informed 
judgments, creating or aggravating information asymmetry between traders and 
market makers.  This implies a decline in liquidity as a direct consequence of 
increased disclosure.  However, less liquidity does not necessarily result in 
decreased trading activity around earning announcements.  This is depicted in 
Figure 2-4. 
 
Direct analysis of market reactions surrounding earnings announcements has 
been studied extensively in the finance literature.  Empirical tests, pioneered by 
Ball and Brown (1968), introduced the event study methodology for analyzing 
abnormal returns.  They report significant abnormal returns around earnings 
surprises.  Early studies also report abnormal trading volume surrounding 
earnings announcements (Beaver, 1968; Kiger, 1972; Morse, 1981).  More 
recent empirical work has confirmed that the market reactions documented are 
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robust to firm size and systematic risk (Ball and Kothari, 1991; Chopra, 
Lakonishok and Ritter, 1992).  These findings suggest that earnings 
announcements have information content which is impounded into stock prices 
when information is released publicly.  Information in earnings reports is also 
impounded before public announcements, suggesting the existence of privately 
informed traders. 
 
Figure 2-4 
Information Asymmetry Around Earning Announcements 
 
To prevent the temporary information advantage held by processors of public 
information, market makers increase spreads, causing a decline in liquidity. 
 
 
With the availability of quote data, a number of empirical studies have focused 
on bid-ask spreads as a proxy of information asymmetry.  Morse and Ushman 
(1983) report no significant increase in spreads for over-the-counter securities 
surrounding earnings announcements. Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) 
corroborate this for NYSE securities, finding no evidence of an increase in 
spreads surrounding regular earnings announcements.  However, Lee, Mucklow 
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and Ready (1993) find evidence to the contrary using intraday data, reporting 
that spreads increase significantly surrounding earnings announcements.   
 
Further examination of the issue through the study of bid-ask spread 
components provides some explanation.  Brooks (1994), Krinsky and Lee 
(1996) and Affleck-Graves, Callahan and Chipalkatti (2002) all report 
significant increases in the asymmetric information component of spreads 
surrounding announcements.  Krinsky and Lee (1996) also report significantly 
reduced inventory holding and order processing components, potentially 
explaining the insignificant reaction in posted spreads despite increased 
information asymmetry. 
 
Based on this, two specific hypotheses will be tested in the first essay of this 
dissertation.  Although most studies have documented no significant increase in 
bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements, this could be driven by a 
myriad of factors including anti-competitive dealer behavior on Nasdaq, or the 
interaction between the specialist and the limit order book on the NYSE.  The 
Blue Chip stocks on the Italian Bourse trade in a pure order-driven 
environment, absent of confounding factors.  If spreads widen around earnings 
announcements, I will be able to detect this using a ‘clean’ experimental market.  
Thus the first hypothesis (H3,1) conjectures that bid-ask spreads will be 
significantly wider surrounding earnings announcements on the Italian Bourse. 
 29 
Hypothesis3,1 : Bid-ask spreads will be significantly wider surrounding earnings 
announcements for Blue Chip stocks on the Italian Bourse. 
 
Extending the idea of wider spreads surrounding earnings announcements, the 
increase in information asymmetry is also likely to cause an increase in trading 
activity and thus volatility.  The second hypothesis (H3,2) thus conjectures that 
both volume and volatility will be significantly higher surrounding earnings 
announcements. 
 
Hypothesis3,2 : Both volume and volatility will be significantly higher 
surrounding earnings announcements for Blue Chip stocks on the Italian 
Bourse. 
 
2.2 Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
While the previous section deals with bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings 
announcements, this section documents the extensive literature pertaining to 
bid-ask spreads both across markets and across the trading day.  Section 2.2.1 
addresses the variation in bid-ask spreads caused by a change in market 
structure.  Section 2.2.2 documents the many studies which analyze the intraday 
pattern of bid-ask spreads. 
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2.2.1 Bid-Ask Spreads across Varying Market Structures 
 
Previous studies have tested whether structurally-induced reductions in trading 
costs emerge when firms relocate from dealer markets to specialist markets.  
Generally, these studies rely on transaction data to document the liquidity gains 
that are realized immediately after firms begin trading on the new exchange.  
 
Reinganum (1990) was one of the first to study the contrast between multiple-
dealership markets, such as Nasdaq, and monopolistic specialist systems, such 
as the NYSE.  He finds that the former has a liquidity advantage over the latter 
for small firms, but the advantage is reversed for large companies.  Neal (1992) 
compares the costs of transacting in equity options between the AMEX 
specialist system and the CBOE competitive dealer system.  He suggests that 
the AMEX specialist structure has lower transaction costs for low-volume 
options.  This difference declines as liquidity increases. 
 
Biais (1993) examines the difference between centralized and fragmented 
markets, where risk-averse agents compete for market orders.  In centralized 
markets, these agents are specialists who compete against a limit order book, 
while in fragmented markets they are dealers competing against each other.  The 
results show that the number of dealers increases with the frequency of trades 
and volatility.  The spread is not significantly different in both markets, 
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although the spread is more volatile in centralized rather than fragmented 
markets.  
 
Christie and Huang (1994) analyze firms that switched from Nasdaq to either 
the NYSE or AMEX.  They provide evidence of structurally induced changes in 
trading costs for firms that elect to move from the dealer market to a specialist 
system.  The bid-ask spread declines significantly when securities move from 
Nasdaq to the NYSE / Amex.  Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1994) 
document that the NYSE trading system lowers order processing costs, but is 
characterized by higher inventory holding costs as the specialist faces a larger 
cost of absorbing a given order imbalance.  Pagano and Roell (1996) focus on 
the degree of transparency as the main difference between trading mechanisms. 
They confirm the finding that uninformed traders’ transaction costs are higher 
in a dealer market than under an auction system.   
 
Barclay (1997) also analyzed a sample of stocks that moved from Nasdaq to the 
NYSE / AMEX.  While trading on Nasdaq, stocks for which dealers avoided 
odd-eight quotes have wider spreads than the stocks for which dealers use both 
odd and even eights.  If Nasdaq spreads are competitive, then stocks for which 
dealers avoid odd-eight quotes should continue to have larger spreads when 
they move to the NYSE / Amex.  His results indicate that effective bid-ask 
spreads decline with the move to the NYSE / Amex.  He attributes this to either 
structural differences between the markets, or to differences in the behavior of 
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the participants in the markets, and not to differences in the individual 
securities. 
 
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) compare execution costs for NYSE and 
Nasdaq listed stocks.  The Nasdaq market leaves dealers more vulnerable to 
losses incurred in trades with better informed investors.  As such, quoted and 
effective spreads could be greater on Nasdaq to allow dealers to recover this 
large economic cost of market making.  This possibility can be evaluated by 
decomposing effective half-spreads into two components: price impact and 
realized half-spreads.  The price impact measures a trade’s average information 
content, which comprises a market-making cost in the form of losses to better 
informed traders.  Realized spreads measure average price reversals after trades 
and market-making revenue net of information costs, confirming that execution 
costs are, on average, greater for trades in Nasdaq issues compared to the 
matched NYSE issues. 
 
Theissen (2000) reports results of several experiments that were conducted to 
compare continuous auction and dealer markets.  Transaction prices in the 
auction market were found to be more efficient than prices in the dealer system.  
Bagliano, Brandolini and Dalmazzo (2000) analyze the co-existence of two 
markets for the same stocks; a quote-driven market (dealer) and an order-driven 
market (auction), on the London SEAQ International.  The model proposed 
shows that investors who desire to trade in large quantities will prefer dealer 
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markets.  Trades of smaller size will be executed at lower cost in an auction 
market. 
 
Recently, Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) find that specialist intervention 
improves liquidity for the most illiquid stocks on the Italian Stock Exchange, 
contrasting previous studies that show spreads are generally tighter in 
continuous auction markets (e.g. Lee, 1993; Christie and Huang, 1994; de Jong, 
Nijman and Roell, 1995; Pagano and Roell, 1996; Huang and Stoll, 1996; Keim 
and Madhavan, 1996; Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997).  Barclay, Christie, 
Harris, Kendal and Schultz (1999) and Bessembinder (1999) document that 
spreads on Nasdaq have fallen since the introduction of competition from limit 
orders in 1997.  However, trade execution costs remain larger than those on the 
NYSE (Bessembinder, 1999). 
 
While these studies are comparing liquidity across exchanges, the exact nature 
of the comparison is unclear.  Nasdaq is a ‘competitive’ dealer market, 
employing several market makers for each security.  The NYSE, however, is 
ambiguous.  Brock and Kleidon (1992) describe specialists on the NYSE as 
monopolistic market makers.  Huang and Stoll (1996) describe the NYSE as an 
auction market that employs a specialist for each security.  Affleck-Graves, 
Hedge and Miller (1994, p1473) describe the specialist as “enjoying an 
exclusive franchise to make a market in a listed stock and to manage the book of 
public limit orders”.  The adoption of a limit order book to provide additional 
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liquidity is considered as competition to the specialist (Glosten, 1994).  Overall, 
the exact nature of trading on the NYSE cannot be classified as a single, 
definitive market structure. 
 
An important caveat from Demsetz (1997) is the direct customer to customer 
interaction through limit orders.  This interaction can obscure the link between 
observed bid-ask spreads and the costs of market making.  Under this 
argument, bid-ask quotes on the NYSE may simply reflect the supply and 
demand conditions of investors rather than the inventory, order processing and 
adverse-selection costs of professional market makers.  
 
This argument is important because if bid-ask spreads on NYSE / Amex bear 
no relation to the costs of market making, then comparing bid-ask spreads on 
Nasdaq with bid-ask spreads on the NYSE / Amex could provide misleading 
inferences about the competitiveness of Nasdaq bid-ask spreads.  Thus 
comparing bid-ask spreads on the NYSE and Nasdaq can be misleading as 
spreads on the NYSE do not accurately represent the costs of making a market.  
 
Based on this, two hypotheses are developed which will be subsequently tested 
in the second essay of this dissertation.  While most studies document a 
reduction in spreads when stocks move from a dealer market (Nasdaq), to a 
specialist or hybrid market (NYSE), this hybrid nature of trading on the NYSE 
makes comparing liquidity across dealer and specialist markets ambiguous.  As 
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stocks on the Italian Bourse moved from a pure order-driven auction market to 
a specialist market, a clean test of specialist intervention on bid-ask spreads is 
possible.  The first hypothesis (H4,1) thus conjectures that bid-ask spreads will 
be tighter under a specialist market structure. 
 
Hypothesis4,1 : Bid-ask spreads will be tighter after stocks switch from an 
auction market to a specialist market on the Italian Bourse. 
 
Directly leading from this first hypothesis, if bid-ask spreads are tighter after 
the switch to a specialist market, then trading activity is also likely to increase 
with the specialist.  The second hypothesis (H4,2) thus conjectures that trading 
activity will increase under a specialist market structure. 
 
Hypothesis4,2 : Trading activity will increase after stocks switch from an 
auction market to a specialist market on the Italian Bourse. 
 
2.2.2 Intraday Analysis of Bid-Ask Spreads 
  
One of the first papers in the area is Amihud and Mendelson (1980).  The main 
issue addressed regarding intraday spreads is the impact of the market maker 
(especially if the market maker is a monopolist).  The market maker’s activity 
can be characterized as a stochastic flow of market buy and sell orders whose 
mean rate per unit of time is price-dependent.  The specialist must pursue a 
 36 
policy of relating prices to inventories to avoid losses.  This inventory-
dependent policy is the main issue of the paper, and the analysis is dependant on 
the quoted bid and ask prices of the market maker.  Price is a monotonically 
decreasing function of inventory, with a positive spread resulting. 
 
Furthermore, the explicit behavior of the bid-ask spread with volume can be 
interpreted as a function of the inventory position, proving that the optimal 
pricing policy is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis (it is impossible 
to consistently profit by speculating in the market, except if the market maker is 
a monopolist).  Market makers face two types of traders: liquidity traders and 
“insider” traders (with superior information).  Market makers gain with the 
former and lose with the latter, and the tradeoff between the two determines the 
spread (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980). 
 
A dealer’s price adjustment depends largely on inventory.  When inventory 
increases, both bid and ask prices decline.  In an inactive stock, when the dealer 
is required to trade a minimum amount, the expected profit from trading may 
not be enough to offset the risk (Ho and Stoll, 1981).  Given the behavior of 
liquidity and informed traders, dealers are required to offer an “out of the 
money” straddle option for a fixed number of shares in a fixed time period.  The 
exercise price of the straddle determines the bid-ask spread.  The dealers 
achieve profit maximizing spreads by balancing the expected total revenues 
from liquidity traders against the expected total losses from informed traders.  A 
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monopolistic dealer will establish a wider bid-ask spread than will perfectly 
competitive dealers. 
 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) show that large trades are made at worse prices than 
small trades.  Even if markets are efficient, trade size and quantity affect price.  
Possible explanations include the inventory imbalance resulting from block 
transactions.  Because large trades force market makers away from their 
preferred inventory positions, prices for these transactions must compensate 
specialists for bearing this inventory risk.  The problem, however, is in 
analyzing the price-quantity relation.  Quantity affects spreads as it is correlated 
with private information about securities’ true value.  An adverse selection 
problem arises given that as they wish to trade, informed traders prefer to trade 
larger amounts at any given price.  Since uninformed traders do not share this 
quantity bias, the larger the trade size, the more likely it is that the market maker 
is trading with an informed trader.  
 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) also argue that the possibility of information-based 
trading can induce a spread between bid and ask quotes, compensating the 
market maker for the risk of doing business with informed traders who have 
superior information.  Here traders always prefer to trade larger quantities.  
Although the market maker faces uncertainty about whether an individual trader 
is informed, there is also the uncertainty about whether any new information 
exists.  The latter uncertainty dictates that both the size and sequence of trades 
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influence the price-quantity relation.  Whereas the first effect causes prices to 
worsen for a block trade, the second effect causes the partial price recovery that 
characterizes most block trading sequences.  Information alone can explain the 
price behavior of block trades, without appealing to inventory adjustment costs. 
 
Several studies show that both variance of price changes and the volatility of 
returns follow a U-shaped intraday pattern.  Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
develop a model in which traders determine when to trade.  Information and 
liquidity are the determinants of the model developed in the paper.  Informed 
traders trade on the basis of the level of private information that is unknown to 
all other traders when the trade takes place.  Liquidity traders, on the other hand, 
trade for reasons that are not directly related to the future payoffs of financial 
instruments.   
 
Most models that involve liquidity trading (i.e. noise trading) assume that 
liquidity traders have no discretion with regard to the timing of their trades.  
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) develop a more reasonable assumption that at 
least some liquidity traders can choose the timing of their trading strategically, 
especially when the market is thick.  Thus, the introduction of ‘more informed’ 
liquidity traders generally intensifies the forces leading to the concentration of 
trading by discretionary liquidity traders.  The interaction between liquidity and 
informed traders leads to a pronounced pattern of trading over time.  However, 
if private signals are weakly correlated, then competition among informed 
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traders can actually worsen the terms of the trade.   An interesting finding made 
by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) is the wider spreads caused by heavier trading 
at the beginning and end of the trading day, compared to the middle of the day. 
 
The adverse selection component of the spread is also supported by Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990).  Their paper analyzes this component for the inter-
temporal behavior of trading volume, trading costs and price volatility, in 
relation to the information advantage held by informed traders in different 
periods.  As prices contain important information for uninformed traders, 
informed traders have the important advantage when the market first opens.  
The longer the market is closed, the more significant is the advantage (i.e. on 
Mondays).  This environment incorporates a single informed trader, a 
competitive market maker and a group of liquidity traders.  
 
In the first instance, Foster and Viswanathan (1990) consider an individual with 
monopolistic access to information and show that, without public revelation, it 
is optimal for the individual to trade in such a way that the market depth (or the 
market maker’s price response to new orders) is the same, and that prices are 
equally informative each day.  When private information is to be publicly 
released at a later date, the informed individual must transact more intensely, 
causing the private information to be released more quickly. 
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Secondly, Foster and Viswanathan (1990) consider the effect of giving some 
liquidity traders discretion to delay their trades for one day without cost, so that 
they can avoid trading when the adverse selection problem is most severe.  
Without public information, informed traders act so as to keep constant the 
trading costs of these discretionary liquidity traders, rendering their delaying 
tactics futile.  However, when some information is publicly released, the 
informed trader’s optimal strategy no longer equalizes the costs of trading for 
the liquidity traders throughout the week.  For example, there are higher trading 
costs and lower volume on Monday relative to Tuesday. 
 
Easley and O’Hara (1992) analyze the stochastic process of prices. In many 
models, the timing of trades is irrelevant as stock prices have no information.  
This specification makes sense if time is exogenous to the price process.  But if 
time can be correlated to any factor related to the value of the asset, then the 
presence or absence of trading may provide information to market participants.  
The authors show that traders learn from both trades and the lack of trades, 
because each could be correlated with different aspects of information.  While 
trades provide evidence of the direction of any new information, the lack of 
trading still can signal the existence of new information.  Spreads depend on the 
time between trades, encouraging spreads to decrease as time increases, and 
inducing a bias to the transaction price estimation.  
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Easley and O’Hara (1992) thus conclude that time affects prices.  If two sell 
transactions occur contiguously in time rather than an hour apart, they can have 
very different information content.  During the interval between trades, market 
makers can revise their beliefs about the value of the asset without it being 
reflected in trade prices.  As prices depend on time, spreads are also time 
dependant.  As the time between trades increases, bid-ask spreads generally 
decrease. 
 
Several other studies model the response of bid and ask quotes to the changes in 
demand for transaction services.  Under mild conditions, increased transaction 
demand at the open and close of trading will result in increased volume and 
wider bid-ask spreads, assuming a monopolistic market maker (Brock and 
Kleidon, 1992).   Foster and Viswanathan (1994) are interested in how the 
existence of pivotal traders affect price determination in a market.  Better 
informed traders realize that their actions are being followed closely, so they 
could alter their trading strategy (and trade away from the open and close) to 
keep their information from being revealed through trading too quickly.  
 
Most models of strategic trading fail to account for this learning among 
informed traders, and focus only on how market makers learn from the order 
flow. While this may be appropriate for some markets, Foster and 
Viswanathan’s (1994) model sheds some light on the complex, strategic 
interaction that occurs in markets such as the commodity future markets.  They 
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find intense trading by all informed traders on their common information in the 
early periods, and greater trading by the better informed traders (based on 
additional information) later in the trading day.   
 
While the above studies are generally theoretical in nature, there is substantial 
empirical research motivated by the growing interest in the price formation 
process.  Ho and Macris (1984) argues that while equilibrium returns follow a 
Brownian motion, transaction prices could be determined by the dealer’s quotes 
relative to the equilibrium prices.  They find that a dealer’s percentage spread is 
positively related to the asset risk, and is larger than the percentage reservation 
spread.  Dealers also adjust quotes in response to changes in inventory 
positions.  Specifically, dealers will lower both bid and ask quotes when they 
have accumulated positive inventory; conversely dealers raise both bid and ask 
quotes when their inventory level is lower than optimal.  Overall, percentage 
spreads depend on the risk of a security. 
 
McInish, Ord and Wood’s (1985) empirical analysis relies on minute by minute 
transaction data.  A profile of the typical trading pattern throughout the day is 
obtained by averaging across trading days within each trading minute.  The 
patterns indicate possible non-stationarity in the data, raising the issue of how 
the autocorrelation function varies over the trading day.  Specifically, 
differences in return distribution are found across trading occurring over-night, 
during the first thirty minutes of the trading day, at the market close, and during 
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the remainder of the day.  The majority of positive returns are earned during the 
first thirty minutes of the trading day, and at the market close.  Outside this 
range, market returns are found to be normally distributed, with the 
autocorrelation substantially reduced. 
 
Hasbrouck (1988) attempts to address problems in previous studies.  He 
presents an empirical framework which includes the simultaneous existence of 
inventory control and asymmetric-information effects.  Using a sample of 
stocks from the NYSE, he finds that trades for low volume stocks exhibit the 
negative autocorrelation consistent with inventory-control effects.  No such 
pattern, however, characterizes high-volume stocks.  This is perhaps a 
consequence of the relatively greater importance for these stocks of public limit 
orders, and the relatively lesser importance of specialist transactions.  For all 
stocks the persistent impact of trades on quote revisions is strongly positive.  
This is consistent with an information effect.  He also finds that for high-volume 
stocks, a persistent order-size effect on quote-revisions exists. This is consistent 
with the view that large orders convey more information. 
 
McInish and Wood (1992) examine both the intraday behavior and the 
determinants of time weighted percentage bid-ask spreads across a sample of 
NYSE stocks in 1989.  On a minute by minute basis, spreads are shown to have 
a crude reverse J-pattern.  While previous studies argue that the bid-ask spread 
is determined by activity, risk, information and competition, their research 
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extends previous studies by using data for 13 intervals of the trading day.  
Specifically, the authors control for trade frequency, trade size, volatility, the 
stock price, regional dealer exchange ratio and dummy variables for inter- and 
intra- day effects.  
 
The evidence garnered from their inter- and intra- day analysis shows that fixed 
trading costs exhibit minimal variation.  However, the adverse selection 
component of the spread varies within the day, and across days.  Adverse 
selection costs are highest in the first hour of trading, fall during the middle of 
the trading day, and then increase towards the close of trading.  Adverse 
selection costs are generally higher on Monday than other days.  Intraday 
trading volume is high when returns are most volatile. 
 
In a vigorous competitive market such as the CBOE, George and Longstaff 
(1993) examine the relation between bid-ask spreads and the determinants of the 
cost of market making, as well as the relation between trading activity and bid-
ask spreads. Determinants of market-making costs explain almost 70 percent of 
the cross-sectional variation in bid-ask spreads. Approximately 50 percent of 
the cross-sectional variation in trading activity is explained by bid-ask spreads 
and features of the option contract (maturity and proximity to in-the-money).  
Regression results suggest that the bid-ask spread is positively related to the 
option’s time to maturity and its price, and negatively related to its delta and the 
level of trading activity.  The institutional features of the trading mechanism 
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affect the cost imposed by the market maker, who is bearing unsystematic risk 
associated with inventory positions. 
 
Similar to Hasbrouck (1988), Madhavan and Smidt (1993) develop a model that 
incorporates the effect of both asymmetric information and inventory control, 
where the dynamic strategic behavior of a market maker and a representative 
informed trader are explicitly characterized.  In their model, the market maker 
acts as both a dealer who provides liquidity on demand and an active investor, 
trading for their own account.  The market maker’s long-run optimal inventory 
is endogenously chosen, and is periodically revised due to changes in the risk 
profile of the underlying stock.  The market maker’s trades also reflect short-run 
speculative demands based on information of the impending order flow. 
 
Empirical findings show mean reversion in inventory, assuming the specialist’s 
desired stock holding is constant.  It takes over 49 trading days, on average, for 
an inventory imbalance to be reduced by 50 percent.  This slow adjustment is 
consistent with the weak inventory effects using intraday data.  Further, the 
model predicts that quote revisions are inversely correlated to specialists’ trades 
and positively related to the information content of the order flow.  
Interestingly, the non-block (unanticipated order imbalance) portion of order 
flow appears to have information content.  The specialist’s quotes anticipate 
future order imbalances, a result consistent with the specialist receiving 
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information about the impending order flow (through leakage in the upstairs 
market).  
 
Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) examine a comprehensive sample of quote, 
trade and inventory holdings for NYSE specialists.  The most salient univariate 
characteristic of specialist holdings is the long persistence of deviations from 
mean values.  If the mean is taken as a good estimate for the time-invariant 
optimum target level, this finding suggests that the conventional inventory 
control mechanisms operate with adjustment lags of days or weeks.  The paper 
provides evidence that specialists are capable of rapidly adjusting their position.  
Moreover, the authors find no evidence that specialists react slowly to inventory 
shocks because they are hedged with offsetting positions in other stocks.  Thus, 
specialists adjust inventory levels toward time-varying targets. 
 
They also find that most of the specialists’ profits arise from the bid-ask spread. 
When specialists’ trades are assumed to take place at the midpoint of the 
prevailing quotes, the implied profits are sharply reduced.  The presence of 
small positive components in the quote midpoint profits over the short and 
medium terms (under 100 transactions) does suggest, however, that specialists 
are able to anticipate price reversals over these horizons (although long term 
estimation is very difficult).  Finally, analysis turns to dynamic modeling of the 
interaction among quotes, trades and inventories.  Shocks to inventories lead (at 
least) to transient effects on quotes.  The impact of a trade is higher if the 
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specialist is the counterparty to the trade, as the specialist is obligated to 
participate in trades during times of high informational asymmetries. 
 
A study by Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) examines the intraday pattern of 
bid-ask spreads for a sample of Nasdaq stocks.  Spreads are relatively stable 
throughout the day, but narrow significantly near the close, contrasting the U-
shaped intraday pattern for NYSE stocks.  The difference is attributed to the 
difference between specialist and dealer market structures.  The wider spread at 
both the open and close on the NYSE may reflect the market power of the 
specialist.  The decline in spreads near the close for Nasdaq stocks is consistent 
with inventory control by individual dealers. 
 
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) study the intraday behavior of spreads for 
high liquidity CBOE options and their underlying stocks.  They confirm the U-
shaped spread pattern for stocks.  However, the options display a very different 
intraday pattern, which declines sharply after the open and then levels off. This 
confirms that both the degree of competition in market making, and the extent 
of informed trading, are important for understanding the intraday behavior of 
spreads. 
 
On the basis of this literature, two hypotheses are developed, which will be 
tested in the final essay of this dissertation.  Most studies using NYSE data have 
found that volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads exhibit a U-shaped intraday 
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pattern.  As discussed previously, trading on the NYSE consists of both a 
specialist and a limit order book (i.e. an auction market).  Several stocks on the 
Italian Bourse switched from an auction market to a specialist market.  The first 
hypothesis (H5,1) thus conjectures that the U-shaped intraday pattern in volume, 
volatility and bid-ask spreads will exist both before and after the structural 
change. 
 
Hypothesis5,1 : Volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads will exhibit the classical 
U-shaped intraday pattern both in an auction market before the structural 
change, and in a specialist market after the structural change. 
 
Following on from this, specialists on the Italian Bourse are effectively 
monopolists.  The market power they possess will allow them to charge higher 
spreads compared to the auction market, especially towards the start and end of 
a trading day.  The second hypothesis (H5,2) thus conjectures that specialists will 
use their market power to charge higher prices throughout the trading day. 
 
Hypothesis5,2 : Specialist’s will use their market power to charge higher prices, 
compared to the auction market throughout the trading day. 
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2.3 Institutional Detail 
 
Initially, the Milan exchange traded securities and commodities, and did not get 
its first corporate listing, a railroad company, until 1859.  Other regional 
exchanges flourished throughout Italy, which became a unified nation in 1861.  
Genoa, a major port, was the main Italian financial market in the 19th century, 
but Milan took the lead after World War I.  The fascist regime imposed a tight 
control on the economy and stifled capital markets.  It was not until the 1980s 
that Italian markets received a boost from the introduction of mutual funds.  
Milan firmly established itself as the leading Italian market with 99 percent of 
overall volume, although nine other regional exchanges struggled while the 
open-outcry system survived.  However, broad market reforms ushered in a 
national computerized order-driven trading system in 1991, and Italy’s 
privatization program in the late 1990’s paved the way for modern equity 
markets.  
 
Since 1991, equity trading on the Italian Bourse has taken place on the Mercato 
Telematico Azionario (MTA), an electronic trading system which enables 
brokers to trade all securities in real-time from computer terminals linked to the 
Italian Bourse.  During 2000, important changes were introduced to the 
operational environment of issuers and intermediaries.  These changes 
encourage the qualitative growth, improve the services offered to market 
participants and expand access to the Italian market. 
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The system regarding common stock, before 2 April, 2001, was essentially 
formed by an order-driven market where ordinary and MIB30 stocks were 
traded.  Two market segments were supported by a specialist: the New Market 
and the Less Liquid Financial Instruments.  The order-driven form of the market 
offered greater opportunities for market expansion because it guaranteed 
impartial treatment with regard to operators who can freely enter trading orders.  
This had positive effects on the competitive level of the market, enhancing the 
quality of prices, trading volume, and thereby, market liquidity. 
 
The combination of this type of market and the presence of a specialist 
responsible for supporting liquidity derives from the need to ensure 
maintenance of a sufficient level of liquidity for stocks which, alongside greater 
yield potential, imply a higher risk level.  These specialists are required to 
expose all orders until a minimum daily quantity is transacted.  However, the 
specialist has monopolistic powers for institutional block orders, where they can 
hold the order for five minutes before deciding to either transact the order, or 
post it in the electronic limit order book (Handbook of World Stock Exchanges, 
2001). 
 
The thinly-traded shares project, which became operative on 19 May, 1997, was 
set the goal of developing the liquidity of less liquid financial instruments.  To 
this end, the Stock Exchange official list was segmented to show shares where 
intervention was required to increase volume, frequency of trading and 
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significance of price.  The reduction in the number of less liquid shares 
indicates the increase in market liquidity generally, and in particular securities 
previously characterized as lower liquidity.  The intervention to improve the 
liquidity of thinly-traded stocks included reduced trading hours.  
 
The New Market commenced trading in 1999.  It is dedicated to small and 
medium sized companies with high growth potential.  In view of the higher risk 
associated with these securities, and therefore of the liquidity support function, 
the specialist enjoys an information monopoly of five minutes during which 
they have exclusive viewing rights of orders above €50,000. 
 
On 2 April, 2001, the new segmentation of the Electronic Share Market (MTA) 
came into effect, defined with a view to make the official Stock Exchange 
market list more representative of the country’s economic reality.  Based on the 
capitalization of the main shares, and in order to give full value to small and 
medium sized stocks, three segments were created.  The first, the Blue Chip 
segment, includes the largest companies with market capitalization in excess of 
€800 million.  For the remaining stocks with market capitalizations below €800 
million, the issuer decided to be included in one of two segments: the Star 
market or the Ordinary (SBO) market. 
 
The Star segment (Segmento Titoli con Alti Requisiti) includes shares of 
medium-sized companies wishing to maximize the value of their listing on the 
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market by observing more stringent requirements in terms of diffusion of 
shares, transparency, corporate governance and trading procedures.  The 
additional requisites (beyond market capitalization) ascribe to the companies 
possessing high qualitative standards, and increasing the image and visibility 
with institutional investors and the general market. 
 
The Star issuer must appoint a specialist who, for the entire period during which 
the shares are traded in the segment, undertakes to perform a dual role.  The first 
is to support the shares’ liquidity, whilst the second relates to assisting in the 
diffusion of reliable information about the company.  From a liquidity 
standpoint, the specialist assures his or her presence in the market by displaying 
continuous bids and asks satisfying some parameters established by the Italian 
Bourse.  These obligations are grouped under three classes and defined in terms 
of minimum daily quantity; obliging the specialist to remain in the order book, 
the minimum size of each single order and the maximum spread within which 
orders must be entered. 
 
Finally, the ordinary segment (SBO) includes the securities of medium and 
small capitalization companies not wishing to acquire the Star status, although 
wanting to enjoy the advantage of being listed on the Stock Exchange.  The 
companies belonging to the segment satisfy the requisites for admission and 
continued inclusion established for Blue Chip companies, however the 
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securities are traded according to procedures and hours that are differentiated by 
liquidity. 
 
The procedures that companies must follow when releasing earnings 
information are described in regulations set by the Italian corporate regulator, 
CONSOB.4  These regulations provide a framework for the timely release of 
price-sensitive information to the market.  Blue Chip and SBO companies are 
recommended to transmit price-sensitive information to CONSOB, the Italian 
Bourse (which reports the announcement through MTA and its web site), and at 
least two international press agencies. The information release procedure is 
compulsory for Star listed companies. 
 
From 1 September, 1999 to 2 April, 2001, liquid stocks were continuously 
traded from 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., after a pre-opening phase and a validation 
phase between 8:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.  Since 2 April, 2001, liquid stocks on the 
first segment of the SBO market have traded continuously between 11:00 a.m. 
and 4:25 p.m.  Blue-Chip and Star stocks trade continuously from 9:30 a.m. to 
5:25 p.m. A closing auction phase was introduced to improve the price 
formation process during the final phase of the trading session.  Through the 
concentration of buying and selling interests present in the market at the end of 
the trading session, it is possible to establish a more accurate closing price. 
 
                                                 
4
 See CONSOB regulation number 11971/99. 
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2.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed previous literature pertaining to bid-ask spreads 
across various market structures.  This dissertation extends the bid-ask spread 
literature in several ways.  The first essay explores the bid-ask spread 
surrounding earnings announcements for pure order driven markets as described 
in Section 2.1.  The second essay of this dissertation compares bid-ask spreads 
across auction and specialist market structures, brought about by the structural 
change implemented by the Italian Bourse, as described in Section 2.2.1.  The 
final essay in this dissertation analyzes the intraday pattern in bid-ask spreads 
across auction markets, and tests the market power of the specialist across the 
trading day, as described in Section 2.2.2. 
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Chapter 3: Bid-Ask Spreads Around Earnings 
Announcements 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes market reactions surrounding earnings announcements on 
the Italian Bourse. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 raises questions 
concerning information asymmetry and the relationship between private and 
public information in securities markets.  If public announcements discourage 
private information gathering, earnings announcements could coincide with 
lower information asymmetry.  However, if some investors can acquire private 
information by processing public announcements, private and public 
information could be complementary, increasing information asymmetry 
surrounding earnings announcements. 
 
Based on this, and the literature in Section 2.1, two hypotheses were developed, 
which will subsequently be tested in this Chapter.  The first hypothesis 
conjectures that bid-ask spreads will increase significantly around earnings 
announcements.  The second hypothesis conjectures that both volume and 
volatility will be significantly higher surrounding earnings announcements. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 describes the 
dataset and subsequent sample used.  Section 3.3 sets out the research design 
and Section 3.4 presents the empirical results. Section 3.5 summarizes the 
chapter. 
 
3.2 Data and Sample 
 
Since 1991, equity trading on the Italian Bourse has taken place on the Mercato 
Telematico Azionario (MTA).  MTA is an electronic trading system that 
enables brokers to trade all securities in real-time from computer terminals 
linked to the Italian Bourse.  Similar to other European markets such as 
Euronext, Deutsche Börse and the London Stock Exchange, the Italian Bourse 
uses a segmented market structure.  Stocks are grouped according to market 
capitalization, each group using a different trading mechanism within MTA.  
The Blue Chip segment comprises the largest stocks, with market capitalization 
greater than €800 million.  Mid-cap stocks trade in the Segmento Titoli con Alti 
Requesti (STAR) segment.  Technology stocks trade in the Nuovo Mercato 
(NM).  All other stocks trade in the Ordinary segment (SBO). 
 
This chapter focuses on the stocks in the Blue Chip segment.  Blue Chip stocks 
are traded in a continuous auction from 9:30 a.m. to 5:25 p.m. each trading day, 
using an open electronic limit order book.  Liquidity is supplied by public limit 
orders without any official market makers.  For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, 
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this enables a cleaner test of asymmetric information surrounding earnings 
announcements.  The procedures that companies must follow when releasing 
earnings information are described in regulations set by the Italian corporate 
regulator, CONSOB.5  These regulations provide a framework for the timely 
release of price-sensitive information to the market.  Blue Chip companies must 
transmit price-sensitive information to CONSOB, the Italian Bourse (which 
reports the announcement through MTA and its web site), and at least two 
international press agencies. 
 
Earnings announcement data for this chapter are obtained from the Italian 
Bourse. The earnings announcement file describes the stock code, 
announcement date and the announcement type.  Announcements are recorded 
as quarterly, half-yearly or annual.  There are 95 stocks in the earnings 
announcement file, and eight announcements per stock from February 14, 2000 
to October 29, 2003, comprising 568 separate announcements.6  Daily price and 
volume data for each stock in the earnings announcement file are gathered from 
Bloomberg.  The Bloomberg file describes the last transaction price, last bid 
quote, last ask quote and daily volume for each stock on each trading day.  Data 
are captured for each stock from 50 trading days prior to the first announcement 
date (December 2, 1999) to 50 days after the last announcement date (February 
19, 2004). 
                                                 
5
 See CONSOB regulation number 11971/99. 
6
 The original sample consisted of 832 separate earnings announcements. Due to missing data, I collected all 
stocks with 8 earnings announcements (two per year from 2000 to 2003), resulting in a sample size of 568. 
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A daily time-series is created for each stock on each trading day.  The following 
variables are calculated using the Bloomberg data: 
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These variables are defined as follows: tiBAS ,  is the observed bid-ask spread (in 
€) for stock i on day t, measured as the difference between the respective end-
of-day ask and bid quotes.  tiPBAS ,  is the proportional bid-ask spread for stock i 
on day t.  This is defined as tiBAS ,  divided by the mid-quote ( ) 2., titi BIDASK + .  
The volatility metric used is the log difference between the high price and low 
price for stock i on day t.  A volume metric referred to as 
.i tSVOL  is also 
constructed, measured as daily volume in shares for stock i on day t divided by 
the number of shares on issue for stock i as at December 1, 1999.  Shares on 
issue are obtained from DataStream.   
 
If on a given day, the stock did not trade, missing values are recorded for the 
stock on that day.  Equally-weighted cross-sectional averages of individual 
stock, volume and volatility measures are constructed each day to proxy for 
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market-wide measures.  Missing values for some stocks on certain days causes 
the number of stocks included in the sample to vary each day.  However, the 
average daily variation is only one percent. 
 
A time-series around each announcement is constructed by linking the time-
series data to the earnings announcement file.  A date relative variable 
indicating the position of an observation from its respective announcement date 
is added.  The number zero is attached to all observations that are recorded on 
an announcement date.  All non-announcement days are then expressed relative 
to the relevant announcement day.  For example, -25 is attached to all 
observations that are recorded 25 days prior to an announcement date. The final 
sample consists of a daily time-series for each announcement that records the 
measures outlined above for the announcement date, as well as 
contemporaneous market-wide measures, from -50 to +50 days around each 
announcement. 
 
3.3 Research Design 
 
3.3.1 Control and Experimental Samples 
 
The method outlined in Morse and Ushman (1983) is used to construct 
experimental and control samples for the bid-ask spread measures, to test for 
significant changes in bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements.  
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Increased bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements are consistent 
with increased information asymmetry.  The volume and volatility measures are 
also examined using the same method to test whether trading activity and price 
informativeness change surrounding earnings announcements. 
 
The experimental sample consists of all observations that are within -25 to +25 
days surrounding each announcement date (denoted as day zero).  Within the 
experimental sample, cross-sectional averages of individual stock measures are 
constructed for each day.  For example, all observations on proportional spreads 
on day -25 are pooled, and then averaged.  This process is repeated each day, 
with the time-series of cross-sectional averages forming the experimental 
sample.  To construct the control sample, time-series for each stock from days   
-50 to -26 and from days +26 to +50 are joined and a cross-sectional average is 
constructed for each day, similar to the experimental sample.  The time-series 
average of these cross-sectional measures is then calculated to arrive at a single 
number which represents the control. 
 
3.3.2 Statistical Tests 
 
To examine whether bid-ask spreads, volume and volatility are significantly 
different surrounding earnings announcements relative to the control period, a 
difference of means test is used.  A Student t-statistic is calculated for each 
metric on each day in the experimental sample to test whether the experimental 
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value for that day is greater than the control value.  The difference of means test 
assumes that the variance of the experimental sample is not necessarily equal to 
the variance of the control sample.  Significance of t-statistics is assessed using 
one-tailed critical values.  To gauge the prevalence of increases in bid-ask 
spreads, volume and volatility across the sample of earnings announcements, 
the frequency of increases in each metric is recorded for each day (from -25 to 
+25).  Relative frequencies are then calculated by dividing the frequency of 
increases by the total number of observations on that day.  Significance of the 
relative frequency of increases on each day is assessed using a binomial test of 
whether the sample proportion exceeds fifty percent. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
3.4.1 Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
Table 3-1 reports the results for bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings 
announcements.  Figure 3-1 shows that bid-ask spreads are generally higher 
than the control throughout the experimental window, with the exception of a 
few days.  The t-statistics reported in Table 3-1 indicate that the difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level on days -5, 0 (the announcement 
day) and +14. 7   These results suggest increased information asymmetry 
surrounding earnings announcements in contrast to previous studies that 
                                                 
7
 Due to a lack of significant results further away from the announcement date, only days -10 to +20 are 
included in each table. 
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examine dealer spreads (Morse and Ushman, 1983; Venkatesh and Chiang, 
1986). The results are consistent with the proposition that public earnings 
announcements are associated with private information gathering, and that 
market participants anticipate informed trading before earnings announcements.  
In summary, the results support the argument that private and public 
information are complements (see Indjejikian, 1991; Harris and Raviv, 1993; 
Kim and Verrecchia, 1991, 1994). 
 
Figure 3-1 
Bid-Ask Spreads Surrounding Earnings Announcements 
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Table 3-1 
Bid-Ask Spreads Surrounding Earnings Announcements 
 
This table reports bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements for a 
sample of 95 stocks listed on the Italian Bourse Blue Chip segment.  570 
individual earnings announcements are examined for the period February 14, 
2000 to October 29, 2003.  Bid-ask spreads are the difference between end-of-
day ask and bid prices.  The experimental sample comprises a time-series of 
cross-sectional average bid-ask spreads from -25 to +25 days surrounding each 
announcement.  Days -50 to -26 and +26 to +50 are used to construct the control 
sample using a similar procedure.  A control value is calculated as the time-
series average across the control sample.  Significance of experimental values is 
assessed using a one-tailed t-test of whether the experimental value is greater 
than the control.  The number of increases in bid-ask spreads each day is also 
reported, with a p-value from a binomial test of whether the proportion of 
increases each day exceeds fifty percent. 
 
Day Sample Size Experimental Control Increases p-value 
- 10  568 0.0573 0.0561 243 0.531 
- 9  568 0.0582 0.0561 240 0.630 
- 8  568 0.0613 0.0561 243 0.531 
- 7  568 0.0684 0.0561 244 0.497 
- 6  568 0.0673 0.0561 256 0.154 
- 5  568   0.0700* 0.0561 225 0.946 
- 4  568 0.0581 0.0561 249 0.334 
- 3  568 0.0619 0.0561 246 0.430 
- 2  568 0.0631 0.0561 235 0.775 
- 1  568 0.0624 0.0561 248 0.365 
0  568   0.0843* 0.0561 239 0.661 
+ 1  568 0.0683 0.0561 239 0.661 
+ 2  568 0.0706 0.0561 241 0.598 
+ 3  568 0.0680 0.0561 238 0.692 
+ 4  568 0.0608 0.0561 268 0.021 
+ 5  568 0.0684 0.0561 244 0.497 
+ 6  568 0.0671 0.0561 238 0.692 
+ 7  568 0.0623 0.0561 210 0.998 
+ 8  568 0.0554 0.0561 261 0.075 
+ 9  568 0.0656 0.0561 258 0.117 
+ 10  568 0.0701 0.0561 264 0.045 
+ 11  568 0.0602 0.0561 236 0.749 
+ 12  568 0.0568 0.0561 247 0.397 
+ 13  568 0.0617 0.0561 260 0.087 
+ 14  568   0.0682* 0.0561 240 0.630 
+ 15  568 0.0625 0.0561 227 0.925 
+ 16  568 0.0597 0.0561 236 0.749 
+ 17  568 0.0575 0.0561 242 0.564 
+ 18  568 0.0598 0.0561 249 0.334 
+ 19  568 0.0618 0.0561 253 0.221 
+ 20  568 0.0569 0.0561 232 0.844 
*Significant at 5% level       
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The results for proportional bid-ask spreads are reported in Table 3-2 and Figure 
3-2, corroborating the euro bid-ask spread.  A number of additional days both 
before and after announcements exhibit significantly higher proportional 
spreads relative to the control period.  This is consistent with increased 
information asymmetry on a greater number of days when spreads are expressed 
in proportional terms.  Overall, the first hypothesis (H3,1) is accepted.  Bid-ask 
spreads increase around earnings announcements. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 
Proportional Bid-Ask Spreads Surrounding Earnings Announcements 
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Table 3-2 
Proportional Bid-Ask Spreads Surrounding Earnings Announcements 
 
This table reports proportional bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings 
announcements for a sample of 95 stocks listed on the Italian Bourse Blue Chip 
segment.  570 individual earnings announcements are examined for the period 
February 14, 2000 to October 29, 2003.  Proportional bid-ask spreads are the 
difference between end-of-day ask and bid prices, divided by the midpoint of 
the bid-ask spread.  The experimental sample comprises a time-series of cross-
sectional average bid-ask spreads from -25 to +25 days surrounding each 
announcement.  Days -50 to -26 and +26 to +50 are used to construct the control 
sample using a similar procedure.  A control value is calculated as the time-
series average across the control sample.  Significance of experimental values is 
assessed using a one-tailed t-test of whether the experimental value is greater 
than the control.  The number of increases in proportional bid-ask spreads each 
day is also reported, with a p-value from a binomial test of whether the 
proportion of increases each day exceeds fifty percent. 
 
Day Sample Size Experimental Control Increases p-value 
- 10  568 0.0064 0.0062 273 0.484 
- 9  568 0.0066 0.0062 270 0.584 
- 8  568 0.0065 0.0062 267 0.679 
- 7  568 0.0065 0.0062 270 0.584 
- 6  568 0.0068 0.0062 295 0.030 
- 5  568   0.0076* 0.0062 262 0.812 
- 4  568 0.0063 0.0062 289 0.084 
- 3  568 0.0067 0.0062 276 0.386 
- 2  568   0.0079* 0.0062 270 0.584 
- 1  568   0.0073* 0.0062 281 0.239 
0  568   0.0079* 0.0062 273 0.484 
+ 1  568   0.0081* 0.0062 284 0.168 
+ 2  568   0.0084* 0.0062 253 0.949 
+ 3  568 0.0071 0.0062 268 0.648 
+ 4  568 0.0070 0.0062 294 0.036 
+ 5  568   0.0076* 0.0062 294 0.036 
+ 6  568   0.0080* 0.0062 253 0.949 
+ 7  568   0.0076* 0.0062 237 0.999 
+ 8  568 0.0066 0.0062 286 0.130 
+ 9  568   0.0072* 0.0062 276 0.386 
+ 10  568   0.0076* 0.0062 300 0.011 
+ 11  568 0.0070 0.0062 258 0.889 
+ 12  568 0.0070 0.0062 273 0.484 
+ 13  568 0.0073 0.0062 263 0.788 
+ 14  568   0.0077* 0.0062 260 0.853 
+ 15  568 0.0074 0.0062 258 0.889 
+ 16  568   0.0071* 0.0062 258 0.889 
+ 17  568 0.0066 0.0062 265 0.736 
+ 18  568 0.0065 0.0062 284 0.168 
+ 19  568 0.0066 0.0062 276 0.386 
+ 20  568 0.0066 0.0062 263 0.788 
* Significant at the 5% level    
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3.4.2 Volume and Volatility 
 
The results for volume (adjusted for shares on issue) are reported in Table 3-3.  
Volume is significantly higher from day 0 to day +8, suggesting increased 
trading activity at the time of and after the announcement of earnings.  This is 
evident in Figure 3-3, which shows a large spike in volume at the time of the 
announcement. 
 
Figure 3-3 
Volume Surrounding Earnings Announcements 
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Table 3-3 
Volume Surrounding Earnings Announcements 
 
This table reports volume (adjusted for shares on issue) surrounding earnings 
announcements for a sample of 95 stocks listed on the Italian Bourse Blue Chip 
segment.  570 individual earnings announcements are examined for the period 
February 14, 2000 to October 29, 2003.  The experimental sample comprises a 
time-series of cross-sectional average volumes from -25 to +25 days 
surrounding each announcement.  Days -50 to -26 and +26 to +50 are used to 
construct the control sample using a similar procedure.  A control value is 
calculated as the time-series average across the control sample.  Significance of 
experimental values is assessed using a one-tailed t-test of whether the 
experimental value is greater than the control.  The number of increases in 
volume each day is also reported, with a p-value from a binomial test of 
whether the proportion of increases each day exceeds fifty percent. 
 
Day Sample Size Experimental Control Increases p-value 
- 10  568 2.9723 3.2395 338 0.040 
- 9  568 3.0848 3.2395 317 0.508 
- 8  568 3.2335 3.2395 359 0.000 
- 7  568 3.5402 3.2395 317 0.508 
- 6  568 3.4761 3.2395 322 0.344 
- 5  568 3.3384 3.2395 327 0.205 
- 4  568 3.2175 3.2395 332 0.106 
- 3  568 3.2470 3.2395 331 0.122 
- 2  568 3.5954 3.2395 332 0.106 
- 1  568 3.4241 3.2395 380 0.000 
0  568   4.4698* 3.2395 366 0.000 
+ 1  568   4.8074* 3.2395 251 1.000 
+ 2  568   4.2131* 3.2395 298 0.947 
+ 3  568   4.0801* 3.2395 309 0.756 
+ 4  568   3.9688* 3.2395 322 0.344 
+ 5  568   3.7421* 3.2395 336 0.056 
+ 6  568   3.8625* 3.2395 303 0.885 
+ 7  568   3.7480* 3.2395 325 0.256 
+ 8  568   3.7928* 3.2395 281 0.999 
+ 9  568 3.7348 3.2395 303 0.885 
+ 10  568 3.5410 3.2395 312 0.671 
+ 11  568 3.6738 3.2395 300 0.927 
+ 12  568 3.3889 3.2395 324 0.284 
+ 13  568 3.5719 3.2395 314 0.608 
+ 14  568 3.5742 3.2395 307 0.806 
+ 15  568 3.1866 3.2395 308 0.782 
+ 16  568 3.0851 3.2395 286 0.996 
+ 17  568 3.1906 3.2395 309 0.756 
+ 18  568 3.0162 3.2395 300 0.927 
+ 19  568 3.2357 3.2395 341 0.022 
+ 20  568 2.9723 3.2395 317 0.508 
* Significant at the 5% level    
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Stock price volatility surrounding earnings announcements is reported in Table 
3-4.  As Figure 3-4 shows, volatility is higher at the time of, and immediately 
following, the announcement.  The t-statistics reported in Table 3-4 indicate that 
volatility is significantly higher than the control from day -4 to day +7.  Given 
that volatility is a proxy for stock price informativeness, the results for volatility 
and volume are consistent with informed trading on earnings information at 
announcement, and up to seven trading days after the announcement.  Based on 
these results, the second hypothesis (H3,2) is also accepted.  Both volume and 
volatility are significantly higher around earnings announcements. 
 
Figure 3-4 
Stock Price Volatility Surrounding Earnings Announcements 
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Table 3-4 
Stock Price Volatility Surrounding Earnings Announcements 
 
This table reports stock price volatility surrounding earnings announcements for 
a sample of 95 stocks listed on the Italian Bourse Blue Chip segment.  570 
individual earnings announcements are examined for the period February 14, 
2000 to October 29, 2003.  Stock price volatility is the log difference between 
high and low prices on a trading day.  The experimental sample comprises a 
time-series of cross-sectional average volatilities from -25 to +25 days 
surrounding each announcement.  Days -50 to -26 and +26 to +50 are used to 
construct the control sample using a similar procedure.  A control value is 
calculated as the time-series average across the control sample.  Significance of 
experimental values is assessed using a one-tailed t-test of whether the 
experimental value is greater than the control.  The number of increases in 
volatility each day is also reported, with a p-value from a binomial test of 
whether the proportion of increases each day exceeds fifty percent. 
 
Day Sample Size Experimental Control Increases p-value 
- 10  568 0.0295 0.0282 338 0.223 
- 9  568 0.0300 0.0282 317 0.463 
- 8  568 0.0303 0.0282 359 0.596 
- 7  568 0.0315 0.0282 317 0.398 
- 6  568 0.0312 0.0282 322 0.596 
- 5  568 0.0314 0.0282 327 0.076 
- 4  568   0.0320* 0.0282 332 0.596 
- 3  568   0.0327* 0.0282 331 0.009 
- 2  568   0.0350* 0.0282 332 0.773 
- 1  568   0.0353* 0.0282 380 0.719 
0  568   0.0412* 0.0282 366 0.176 
+ 1  568   0.0375* 0.0282 251 0.820 
+ 2  568   0.0352* 0.0282 298 0.176 
+ 3  568   0.0363* 0.0282 309 0.136 
+ 4  568   0.0358* 0.0282 322 0.276 
+ 5  568   0.0353* 0.0282 336 0.366 
+ 6  568   0.0370* 0.0282 303 0.176 
+ 7  568    0.0371* 0.0282 325 0.690 
+ 8  568 0.0309 0.0282 281 0.923 
+ 9  568 0.0301 0.0282 303 0.934 
+ 10  568 0.0300 0.0282 312 0.879 
+ 11  568 0.0302 0.0282 300 0.463 
+ 12  568 0.0303 0.0282 324 0.305 
+ 13  568 0.0305 0.0282 314 0.773 
+ 14  568 0.0312 0.0282 307 0.961 
+ 15  568 0.0309 0.0282 308 0.305 
+ 16  568 0.0297 0.0282 286 0.430 
+ 17  568 0.0304 0.0282 309 0.335 
+ 18  568 0.0299 0.0282 300 0.998 
+ 19  568 0.0305 0.0282 341 0.012 
+ 20  568 0.0304 0.0282 317 0.953 
* Significant at the 5% level    
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3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter provides new evidence that bid-ask spreads increase significantly 
surrounding earnings announcements, in contrast to prior evidence from US 
markets which is inconclusive.  The use of bid-ask spreads from a purely order-
driven environment mitigates the problems inherent in prior studies that use 
dealer spreads, enabling a cleaner test of information asymmetry surrounding 
earnings announcements.  The results are consistent with an increase in 
information surrounding earnings announcements, suggesting that private and 
public information are complements.  Both the first hypothesis that bid-ask 
spreads are wider, and the second hypothesis that volume and volatility is 
higher around earnings announcements, are accepted. 
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Chapter 4: Bid-Ask Spreads Under Auction and Specialist 
Market Structures 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes bid-ask spreads under specialist and auction market 
structures on the Italian Bourse. The institutional detail discussed in Section 2.3 
described how several stocks that originally traded in an order-driven auction 
market switched to a specialist market structure.  The literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2 also highlighted the many studies that have attempted to compare 
spreads (and thus liquidity) across various market structures.  However, the 
hybrid nature of trading on the NYSE (which combines a specialist with a limit 
order book) complicates the comparison, making results ambiguous.  The 
switch from an auction to a specialist market on the Italian Bourse thus provides 
a natural experiment to compare the benefits / costs of a specialist market 
structure.  
 
Based on this, and the literature in Section 2.2.1, two hypotheses were 
developed, which will be subsequently tested in this chapter.  The first 
hypothesis conjectures that bid-ask spreads will decrease significantly under a 
specialist market structure.  The second hypothesis conjectures that trading 
activity will increase with specialist intervention. 
 72 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 describes the 
dataset and subsequent sample used.  Section 4.3 sets out the research design, 
Section 4.4 presents the empirical results, while Section 4.5 presents several 
additional tests.  Section 4.6 summarizes the chapter.  Section 4.7 then provides 
a list of ticker symbols of Star and SBO stocks used throughout this chapter. 
 
4.2 Data and Sample 
 
To test the effect of moving from an auction market to a specialist market, I 
identify firms that were listed on the original market structure (liquid and less 
liquid securities), and moved to one of the three new segments (Blue Chip, SBO 
or Star).  To control for major differences in liquidity and firm size, several 
stocks are automatically excluded from the sample.  Stocks that traded as less 
liquid securities, or stocks that moved to the blue chip segment, are not 
considered.8  From the remaining stocks, I select all stocks that traded for at 
least 12 months prior to and after the structural change.  This leaves a total of 77 
stocks.  Of these 77 stocks, 57 continued trading in the ordinary auction market 
(SBO market), while 20 commenced trading in the new Star market. 
 
For these 77 stocks, I collect daily closing bid, ask and transaction prices, both 
one year before and after the 2 April, 2001 structural change.  Also collected are 
daily high and low prices, and daily turnover for each stock.  Market 
                                                 
8
 Also excluded are foreign listed companies. 
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capitalization of all 77 firms on the trading day prior to the structural change is 
also available.  The data is sourced from a Bloomberg database. 
 
4.3 Research Design 
 
In order to explore the impact on the bid-ask spread of the change from an 
auction market to a specialist market, and to test the first hypothesis, two 
measures are examined.9  The first is the quoted spread (in €), defined as: 
 Quoted Spread = Ask – Bid 
To control for stock price variations, both over time and across stocks, I also 
examine the proportional quoted spread, defined as: 
 Proportional Spread = (Ask – Bid) / [(Ask + Bid) / 2]  
 
Also, other stock factors, including turnover and volatility could vary with the 
switch, for both the Star and SBO markets.  Changes in these other factors could 
drive variation in spreads.  To control for the impact that these additional factors 
have on the spread, and to test the second hypothesis, four regressions are 
estimated.  The first two control for variation (both over time and across stocks) 
in the spreads of stocks that remain in the auction market segment.  Specifically, 
the following two regressions are estimated: 
                                                 
9
 Prior literature also examines the effective spread, which takes into account trading within the best bid and ask 
quotes.  As the pre-period in the experiment utilized only an auction market, no trading occurred within the best 
quotes.  Thus, the effective spread is equal to the quoted spread.  However, for stocks that moved to the Star 
market, trading inside the spread can be facilitated by the specialist.  To examine this possibility, an additional 
test comparing the quoted and effective spreads for the Star stocks after the structural change is reported later in 
the chapter.   
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 Star_QSt = β0 + β1 Changet + β2 SBO_QSt + εt   (4-1) 
 Star_PSt = β0 + β1 Changet + β2 SBO_PSt + εt,   (4-2) 
 
where Changet is a dummy variable that takes the value of one after the 
structural change, zero otherwise.  Star_QSt is the quoted spread (in €) for 
stocks that moved to the specialist Star market and Star_PSt is the proportional 
quoted spread for the same stocks.  SBO_QSt is the quoted spread (in €) for 
stocks that remained in the SBO auction market and SBO_PSt is the 
proportional quoted spread for the same stocks. 
 
As the bid-ask spread is dependant on several factors including turnover and 
volatility, I also control for these factors.  The next two regressions examine the 
change in spread for Star stocks after controlling for changes in turnover and 
volatility in both the Star and SBO markets.10  Specifically, the following two 
regressions are estimated:  
 
Star_QSt = β0 + β1 Changet + β2 ln(SBO_Turnt) + β3 SBO_Volt  
+ β4 ln(Star_Turnt) + β5 Star_Volt + εt   (4-3) 
 
                                                 
10
 Specifically, the quoted spread for Star stocks is estimated using the following regression:  
 
Star_QSt = β0’ + β1’ Star_Turnt + β2’ Star_Volt + εt’     (4-3’) 
 
Similarly, the quoted spread for SBO stocks is estimated using the following regression:  
 
SBO_QSt = β0’’ + β1’’ SBO_Turnt + β2’’ SBO_Volt + εt’’    (4-3’’) 
 
Substituting (4-3’) and (4-3’’) into (4-1) leads to (4-3).  Similar calculations are used for the proportional spread, 
resulting in (4-4). 
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Star_PSt = β0 + β1 Changet + β2 ln(SBO_Turnt) + β3 SBO_Volt  
+ β4 ln(Star_Turnt) + β5 Star_Volt + εt   (4-4) 
 
where ln(SBO_Turnt) is calculated as the natural logarithm of daily stock 
turnover (in €) for SBO stocks and SBO_Volt is the daily volatility, calculated 
as the log difference between the high price and low price on each trading day 
for SBO stocks.  Both ln(Star_Turnt) and Star_Volt are calculated similarly for 
Star stocks.  Changet is again a dummy variable that takes the value of one after 
the structural change, zero otherwise.11  All variables are calculated using data 
from 12 months prior to and after the structural change. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
 
4.4.1 Univariate Results 
 
Table 4-1 provides descriptive statistics for the two spread measures, as well as 
other stock characteristics, for stocks that moved from the auction market to the 
Star market, and for stocks remaining in the auction (SBO) market.  Statistics 
are calculated using data from 12 months prior to and after the structural 
change. 
 
                                                 
11
 Dependant variables are as described for the first two regressions. 
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For the 20 stocks that switched to the specialist Star market, the quoted spread 
falls from €0.059 to €0.043, a significant reduction of €0.016.  After adjusting 
for the stock price, the proportional spread falls from 1.122 percent to 1.039 
percent; a significant reduction of 0.083 percent.  Over the same period, stocks 
that remained in the auction market show a reduction in quoted spread of 
€0.014.  However, the proportional spread increased by the insignificant amount 
of 0.024 percent.   
 
Overall, univariate results indicate a reduction in bid-ask spreads when stocks 
move from an auction market to a specialist market.  This reduction is evident 
in Figures 4-1 and 4-2.  The reduction in both quoted and proportional spreads 
occurs on the day of the structural change (day zero), after which a new 
equilibrium bid-ask spread level is attained.  Overall, I accept the first 
hypothesis (H4,1).  Bid-ask spreads are significantly tighter under a specialist 
market structure. 
 
Table 4-1 also presents descriptive statistics for several stock characteristics.  
Closing prices for stocks that switched to the Star market have fallen.  Prior to 
the move, the average closing price is €5.35, whilst after the move the average 
falls to €4.43.  The average daily volume also falls by 17,578 shares 
(insignificantly different from zero).  Given the significant reduction in stock 
price, and the minor reduction in volume, stock turnover also falls, from an 
average of €555,827 in the 12 months prior, to an average of €363,457 in the 12 
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months after the switch.  However, stock volatility is significantly reduced 
under the specialist system, with a reduction of 0.156 percent. 
 
Figure 4-1 
Quoted Euro Spreads 
 
This figure depicts the average quoted euro spread for the 20 stocks that moved 
from the auction market to the Star specialist market on 2 April, 2001.  Day 
zero is the first day of trading in the Star market. 
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Figure 4-2 
Proportional Quoted Spreads 
 
This figure depicts the average proportional quoted spread for the 20 stocks that 
moved from the auction market to the Star specialist market on 2 April, 2001.  
Day zero is the first day of trading in the Star market. 
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Over the same period, stocks remaining in the auction market (SBO stocks) also 
exhibit variation.  The average stock price falls from €4.43 to €3.47, whilst 
average volume falls from 275,645 to 234,402.  Together, this leads to a 
reduction in turnover of €161,017, similar to the Star market.  However, the 
volatility of the SBO stocks remains constant after the structural change.  
Overall, trading activity for Star and SBO stocks falls after the switch, although 
the reduction in spreads is localized to Star stocks.  Based on this, the second 
hypothesis (H4,2) is rejected.  Trading activity is not significantly higher under a 
specialist market structure. 
 
4.4.2 Regression Results 
 
The univariate results indicate a significant reduction in bid-ask spreads when 
stocks move to a specialist market.  Table 4-2 presents coefficient estimates and 
adjusted R-squared values for the four regressions.  The first two regressions 
indicate that after controlling for variation in SBO stock spreads (which have a 
positive effect on Star stock spreads), both the quoted and proportional spreads 
are reduced after the structural change.  Both dummy variables have negative 
coefficients which are significant at all conventional levels. 
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Table 4-1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics (number of stocks, quoted and 
proportional spread, closing price, daily volume, daily turnover and daily 
volatility) for the 20 Star and 57 SBO stocks.  Stocks are included if they traded 
continuously for 12 months prior to and after the 2 April, 2001 structural 
change.  Volatility is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of daily 
high to low stock prices.  For each variable, the table reports the mean, median 
and change in mean for the 12 months before and after the structural change.  
Statistical significance emanates from the test of whether the mean change is 
significantly different from zero.   
 
  Star market  SBO market 
  Before After  Before After 
Number of stocks  20  57 
Quoted spread (€)       
 Mean  0.059 0.043  0.052 0.038 
 Median  0.055 0.042  0.051 0.038 
 Mean change  -0.016**  -0.014** 
Proportional spread (%)       
 Mean  1.122 1.039  1.320 1.344 
 Median  1.062 1.016  1.276 1.307 
 Mean change  -0.0830**  0.0240 
Closing price (€)       
 Mean  5.35 4.43  4.43 3.47 
 Median  5.38 4.36  4.45 3.22 
 Mean change  -0.92**  -0.96** 
Daily volume (shares)       
 Mean  111,612 94,034  275,645 234,402 
 Median  107,328 89,034  211,717 189,742 
 Mean change  -17,578  -41,243 
Daily turnover (€)       
 Mean  555,827 363,457  845,462 684,445 
 Median  422,429 319,842  617,682 519,683 
 Mean change  -192,370**  -161,017** 
Daily volatility (%)       
 Mean  2.810 2.654  3.058 3.029 
 Median  2.730 2.493  2.891 2.829 
 Mean change  -0.1560*  -0.0290 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
    * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
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The next two regressions, after controlling for turnover and volatility in both the 
Star and SBO markets, indicate that both the quoted and proportional spreads 
decline after the structural change.  The coefficients for the dummy variables 
are significantly negative (at all conventional levels).  Coefficient estimates for 
the four explanatory variables are as expected.  An increase in turnover in both 
the Star and SBO markets reduces spreads, although the univariate results 
indicate that both turnover and spreads decline for Star stocks.  An increase in 
volatility widens spreads.  Overall, after controlling for spreads in the SBO 
market, and other factors affecting spreads in both the Star and SBO markets, 
both the quoted and proportional spreads are significantly tighter under a 
specialist rather than auction market structure.  I thus confirm the acceptance of 
the first hypothesis (H4,1). 
 
4.5 Additional Tests 
 
This section provides several additional tests to examine the robustness of the 
reduced spread for the specialist market stocks. 
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Table 4-2 
Multiple Regression Results 
 
This table reports results from the four regressions for the 20 stocks that moved from an auction market to the specialist Star 
market on 2 April, 2001.  Stocks are included if they traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural change.  
The dependant variable is measured as the quoted euro spread for the Star stocks in the first and third regressions, while it is 
measured as the proportional quoted spread in the second and fourth regressions.  The change dummy variable takes the value of 
one after the structural change, zero otherwise.  The SBO spread variable is the quoted euro spread for the first regression, and the 
proportional quoted spread for the second regression.  The third and fourth regressions include the natural logarithm of the euro 
turnover for Star and SBO stocks, as well as the percentage volatility, measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of daily high 
to low stock prices, again for Star and SBO stocks.  All variables are calculated using data from 12 months prior to and after the 
structural change.  For each regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-squared values are reported. 
 
Dependant variable  Intercept Change 
 
SBO spread 
 
SBO turnover ln(€) SBO volatility (%) Star turnover ln(€) Star volatility (%) Adj. R2 
Star quoted spread (€)  0.0281** -0.0072** 0.5884**     0.3660 
Star proportional spread (%)  0.0041** -0.0009** 0.5350**     0.4060 
Star quoted spread (€)  0.0430** -0.0170** -- -0.0050* 0.5492** -0.0047* 0.3551* 0.3560 
Star proportional spread (%)  0.0084** -0.0011** -- -0.0011** 0.0870** -0.0012** 0.1327** 0.3833 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
  * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
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4.5.1 Effect of Firm Size and Industry Affiliation 
 
Much of the literature has suggested that although specialist markets provide 
lower spreads than dealer markets, the benefit from shifting to a specialist 
market is greater for smaller firms.  As the Italian Bourse already has a segment 
for large firms in excess of €800 million known as “Blue Chips” (which are 
analyzed in the previous chapter), the stocks remaining in the SBO and Star 
markets are medium to small capitalization stocks.  To examine the impact of 
firm size, I divide the samples of SBO and Star stocks into two groups.   
 
As the average market capitalization of both the Star and SBO samples is 
approximately €300 million, all stocks with market capitalizations greater than 
€300 million are considered medium capitalization stocks, while all stocks less 
than €300 million in capitalization are considered small capitalization stocks.  
The analysis around the structural change is then completed separately for small 
and medium capitalization stocks.  The results are presented in Table 4-3 
(market capitalization details), Table 4-4 (small capitalization stocks) and Table 
4-5 (medium capitalization stocks). 
 
Descriptive market capitalization statistics are presented in Table 4-3 for all 
stocks, small capitalization stocks and medium capitalization stocks.  The 
average market capitalization of small stocks is €146.9 million for Star stocks 
and €142.1 million for SBO stocks.  The medium capitalization stocks have an 
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average of €513.7 million for Star stocks and €493.7 million for SBO stocks.  
The median results also indicate that the within the small and medium groups, 
there is minimal difference between the market capitalization of Star and SBO 
stocks.  There is minimal difference in the size of firms that moved to the 
specialist market or remained in the auction market. 
 
Descriptive spread and stock statistics are presented in Panel A of both Table 4-
4 and Table 4-5.  The reduction in spreads for small capitalization stocks 
averages €0.018 (proportional spread falls by 0.1000 percent), while the 
reduction averages €0.016 (0.1078 percent in proportional spreads) for medium 
capitalization stocks.  Regression results, in Panel B of both tables, are also 
consistent.  All dummy variables are significantly negative across all eight 
regressions.  All turnover variables have negative coefficients, while volatility 
variables have positive coefficients.  The reduction in spreads occurs for both 
small and medium capitalization stocks. 
 
Extending the role of firm size, a large firm in a particular industry sector may 
be considered a small firm in another industry sector.  To examine if the market 
capitalization of a firm within a particular industry sector affects spreads, I 
perform a matching procedure with the two samples.  For each Star stock, I find 
all SBO stocks in the same industry sector.  From all possible matches, I select 
the SBO stock with a market capitalization closest to the capitalization of the 
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Star stock.  I do this for all 20 Star stocks.  The regression results are presented 
in Table 4-6. 
 
Table 4-3 
Market Capitalization 
 
This table reports descriptive market capitalization statistics for the 20 stocks 
that moved from an auction market to the Star specialist market on 2 April, 
2001, and the 57 stocks which remained in the ordinary SBO auction market.  
Stocks are included if they traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after 
the structural change.  Stocks with market capitalizations below the overall 
mean are moved into the small stock segment, while stocks with market 
capitalizations above the overall mean are moved into the medium stock 
segment.  For each Star and SBO sample, the table reports the mean, minimum, 
median and maximum value, calculated on the trading day prior to the structural 
change.  All amounts shown are in millions of euros. 
 
  Mean Minimum Median Maximum 
All stocks 
(20 Star, 57 SBO)      
 Star  296.9 37.08 258.8 724.5 
 SBO  277.9 16.73 146.0 798.5 
Small stocks 
(12 Star, 42 SBO)      
 Star  146.9 37.08 135.0 293.2 
 SBO  142.1 16.73 125.4 286.8 
Medium stocks 
(8 Star, 15 SBO)      
 Star  513.7 305.5 556.8 724.5 
 SBO  493.7 309.8 491.6 798.5 
 
The results in Table 4-6 are consistent with the full sample results.  After 
controlling for spread changes in the matched SBO stocks, spreads for the Star 
stocks still show considerable reductions, with both dummy variables 
significantly negative.  The last two regressions, after controlling for turnover 
and volatility of both the SBO and Star matched stocks, again indicates a 
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reduction in spreads, with both dummy variables significantly negative.  The 
reduction in spreads when stocks move from an auction market to a specialist 
market is thus robust to both the size and industry affiliation of the firm. 
 
4.5.2 Length of Event Window 
 
Over time, a stock’s characteristics vary.  Thus, the event window in which 
variables are measured is important.  A 12 month pre- and post- event window 
could include significant variation in turnover and volatility.  To examine the 
sensitivity of results to the length of the event window, I calculate all variables 
for both three and six months before and after the structural change.  I then re-
estimate all four regressions separately for the three month and six month event 
windows.  The results are presented in Table 4-7. 
 
The three month results are presented in Panel A.  Consistent with earlier 
findings, all four regressions have significantly negative coefficients for the 
dummy variable.  Unlike with the previous regressions though, all turnover 
explanatory variables are insignificantly negative, while only the Star volatility 
variables are significantly positive (the SBO volatility variables are positive, but 
not significantly different from zero). 
 
 86 
 
 
Table 4-4 
Small Stock Segment 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics, including quoted and proportional spread, turnover and volatility (Panel A) and 
regression results (Panel B) for small Star and SBO stocks, as classified in Table 4-3.  Stocks are included if they traded 
continuously for 12 months prior to and after the 2 April, 2001 structural change.  For each variable, the table reports the 
mean and median (in parentheses) for the 12 months before and after the structural change, and the change in mean values.  
Statistical significance emanates from the test of whether the mean change is significantly different from zero.  In the 
regressions, the dependant variable is measured as the quoted euro spread for the Star stocks in the first and third 
regressions, while it is measured as the proportional quoted spread in the second and fourth regressions.  The change 
dummy variable takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise.  The SBO spread variable is the quoted 
euro spread for the first regression, and the proportional quoted spread for the second regression.  The third and fourth 
regressions include the natural logarithm of the euro turnover and percentage volatility for Star and SBO stocks.  For each 
regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-squared values are reported. 
 
A.  
Descriptive 
statistics 
 
Mean before 
(Median before) 
Mean after 
(Median after) Mean change 
Quoted  
spread (€)  
0.068 
(0.04) 
0.050 
(0.03) -0.018** 
Proportional spread 
(%)  
1.254 
(1.046) 
1.154 
(1.016) -0.1000** 
Turnover (€)  281,528 (139,162) 
224,888 
(104,480) -56,639** 
Volatility (%)  2.514 (2.207) 
2.309 
(2.074) -0.2050** 
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Table 4-4, continued 
 
B.  
Regressions  Intercept Change 
 
SBO spread 
 
SBO turnover 
ln(€) 
SBO volatility 
(%) 
Star turnover 
ln(€) 
Star volatility 
(%) Adj. R
2
 
Star quoted 
spread (€)  0.0376** -0.0134** 0.4072**     0.3565 
Star 
proportional 
spread (%) 
 0.0030** -0.0004* 0.6157**     0.4448 
Star quoted 
spread (€)  0.1598** -0.0194** -- -0.0050** 0.4447** -0.0046* 0.3604* 0.3688 
Star 
proportional 
spread (%) 
 0.0346** -0.0010** -- -0.0013** 0.0788** -0.0015* 0.1633* 0.4260 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
  * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
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Table 4-5 
Medium Stock Segment 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics, including quoted and proportional spread, turnover and volatility (Panel A) and 
regression results (Panel B) for medium Star and SBO stocks, as classified in Table 4-3.  Stocks are included if they traded 
continuously for 12 months prior to and after the 2 April, 2001 structural change.  For each variable, the table reports the 
mean and median (in parentheses) for the 12 months before and after the structural change, and the change in mean values.  
Statistical significance emanates from the test of whether the mean change is significantly different from zero.  In the 
regressions, the dependant variable is measured as the quoted euro spread for the Star stocks in the first and third 
regressions, while it is measured as the proportional quoted spread in the second and fourth regressions.  The change 
dummy variable takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise.  The SBO spread variable is the quoted 
euro spread for the first regression, and the proportional quoted spread for the second regression.  The third and fourth 
regressions include the natural logarithm of the euro turnover and percentage volatility for Star and SBO stocks.  For each 
regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-squared values are reported. 
 
A.  
Descriptive 
statistics 
 
Mean before 
(Median before) 
Mean after 
(Median after) Mean change 
Quoted  
spread (€)  
0.045 
(0.023) 
0.029 
(0.019) -0.016** 
Proportional 
spread (%)  
0.9553 
(0.7269) 
0.8475 
(0.7014) -0.1078** 
Turnover (€)  739,680 (471,567) 
523,544 
(369,314) -216,136** 
Volatility (%)  3.065 (2.541) 
2.754 
(2.221) -0.3115** 
 89 
 
 
Table 4-5, continued 
 
B.  
Regressions  Intercept Change 
 
SBO spread 
 
SBO turnover 
ln(€) 
SBO volatility 
(%) 
Star turnover 
ln(€) 
Star volatility 
(%) Adj. R
2
 
Star quoted 
spread (€)  0.0181** -0.0032* 0.3573**     0.3220 
Star 
proportional 
spread (%) 
 0.0053** -0.0007** 0.4436**     0.2464 
Star quoted 
spread (€)  0.0593 -0.0092** -- -0.0025 0.3264* -0.0010 0.7721** 0.2389 
Star 
proportional 
spread (%) 
 0.0245** -0.0013** -- -0.0010** 0.0838** -0.0005 0.0946** 0.2890 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
     * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
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Table 4-6 
Size and Industry Matched Sample 
 
This table reports results from the four regressions for the 20 stocks that moved from an auction market to the specialist Star 
market on the 2 April, 2001.  Stocks are included if they traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural 
change.  The SBO sample is based on a matching procedure with the 20 Star stocks.  First all SBO stocks are grouped 
according to industry affiliation.  Then for each Star stock, the SBO stock from the same industry group, with a market 
capitalization as close as possible to the Star stock, is selected.  This results in a matched Star – SBO sample of 20 stocks.  
From this sample, the dependant variable is measured as the quoted euro spread for the Star stocks in the first and third 
regressions, while it is measured as the proportional quoted spread in the second and fourth regressions.  The Change 
dummy variable takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise.  The SBO spread variable is the quoted 
euro spread for the first regression, and the proportional quoted spread for the second regression.  The third and fourth 
regressions include the natural logarithm of the euro turnover and percentage volatility for Star and SBO stocks.  For each 
regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-squared values are reported. 
 
Dependant variable  Intercept Change 
 
SBO spread 
 
SBO turnover ln(€) SBO volatility (%) Star turnover ln(€) Star volatility (%) Adj. R2 
Star quoted spread 
(€)  0.0326** -0.0078** 0.5835**     0.2564 
Star proportional 
spread (%)  0.0048** -0.0012** 0.5590**     0.4415 
Star quoted spread 
(€)  0.1595** -0.0203** -- -0.0030* 0.7942** -0.0076** 0.5631** 0.2687 
Star proportional 
spread (%)  0.0344** -0.0016** -- -0.0013** 0.1324** -0.0011** 0.1774** 0.3974 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
  * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level
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The six month results are presented in Panel B of Table 4-7.  As with the three 
month results, all dummy variables are significantly negative, indicating a 
reduction in spreads around the structural change.  All explanatory variables are 
significantly different from zero in their proposed directions, except for the 
SBO variables in the third regression, which are insignificantly different from 
zero (although in their expected direction).  I conclude that the finding of a 
reduction in spreads when stocks switch to a specialist market is robust to the 
length of the event window. 
 
4.5.3 Control with the ‘New Market’ 
 
It is possible that market wide events are narrowing spreads.  Over the transition 
period, trading in the New Market continued normally.  Although New Market 
stocks are generally high-growth, high-volatility stocks, if spreads and other 
stock characteristics exhibit systematic changes over the same event window, 
overall market forces could be driving the decline in spreads for Star stocks.  To 
examine this possibility, I analyze a sample of stocks trading on the New 
Market over the same time period.  The results are presented in Table 4-8. 
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 Table 4-7 
Sensitivity to Event Window 
This table reports results from the four regressions for the 20 stocks that moved from an auction market to the specialist Star 
market on 2 April, 2001.  Stocks are included if they traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural change.  
The dependant variable is measured as the quoted euro spread for the 20 Star stocks in the first and third regressions, while it is 
measured as the proportional quoted spread in the second and fourth regressions.  The change dummy variable takes the value of 
one after the structural change, zero otherwise.  The SBO spread variable is the quoted euro spread for the first regression, and the 
proportional quoted spread for the second regression.  The third and fourth regressions include the natural logarithm of the euro 
turnover and percentage volatility for Star and SBO stocks.  All variables are calculated using data from three months (Panel A) 
and six months (Panel B) around the structural change.  For each regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and 
adjusted R-squared values are reported.  
 
Dependant variable  Intercept Change 
 
SBO spread 
 
SBO turnover 
ln(€) 
SBO volatility 
(%) 
Star turnover 
ln(€) 
Star volatility 
(%) Adj. R
2
 
Panel A: 3 month window 
Star quoted spread 
(€)  0.0332** -0.0080** 0.3864**     0.2087 
Star proportional 
spread (%)  0.0064** -0.0013** 0.3607**     0.4215 
Star quoted spread 
(€)  0.0645 -0.0070* -- 0.0009 0.0314 -0.0036 0.7995* 0.1734 
Star proportional 
spread (%)  0.0187* -0.0007* -- -0.0004 0.0635 -0.0007 0.1615** 0.4273 
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Table 4-7, continued 
 
Panel B: 6 month window 
Star quoted spread 
(€)  0.0331** -0.0107** 0.4862**     0.2606 
Star proportional 
spread (%)  0.0047** -0.0009** 0.4841**     0.2871 
Star quoted spread 
(€)  0.1308** -0.0121** -- -0.0009 0.2600 -0.0071* 0.8344* 0.2582 
Star proportional 
spread (%)  0.0279** -0.0007* -- -0.0011* 0.1018** -0.0009* 0.2102* 0.4178 
    ** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
        * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level
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As the New Market commenced trading in June 1999, only six stocks traded for 
the full two year period around the structural change.  As the previous section 
shows that results are robust over both three and six month event windows, to 
increase the number of stocks included, I present results for the 13 stocks that 
traded for the entire six months prior to and after the change.  Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Panel A of Table 4-8.  Similar to Star and SBO stocks, 
the quoted spread declines over the period (with a reduction of €0.15).  After 
adjusting for the stock price, results indicate an increase in proportional spread, 
although this increase is not significantly different from zero.  Both turnover 
and volatility experience minimal variation around the structural change. 
 
The four regressions used previously are estimated, with New Market variables 
replacing SBO variables.  The results from all four regressions indicate that 
spreads in Star stocks decline after they commence trading in the specialist 
market.  Unlike with the SBO variables, the New Market turnover and volatility 
variables have coefficients insignificantly different from zero for the final two 
regressions.  I thus confidently conclude that factors affecting the market overall 
are not driving the reduction in spreads for Star stocks.12 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 I also test the impact of the New Market over three and 12 month periods around the structural change.  With 
the three month period, 18 stocks are included, whilst there are only six stocks for the 12 month period.  Under 
both alternatives, results are qualitatively similar.  There is strong evidence that the quoted and proportional 
spreads decline when stocks commence trading in the specialist Star market. 
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4.5.4 The Role of Effective Spreads 
 
Much of the previous literature has calculated effective spreads.  Effective 
spreads capture the actual cost of executing trades when some transactions 
occur inside the best bid and ask quotes.  Prior to the structural change, all 
trading took place on an electronic auction market.  Thus, no transactions 
occurred within the best quotes, and the effective spread equaled the quoted 
spread.  Before and after comparisons of the effective spread are meaningless.  
However, the results indicate that quoted spreads (both euro and proportional) 
are reduced when stocks move to the specialist market.  If the specialist allows 
trades to occur inside the spread, the effective spreads will be lower than the 
quoted spreads after the structural change, providing further evidence of the 
benefits of a specialist market structure. 
 
To examine this issue, I calculate the effective quoted half spread as 
[Transaction Price – (Ask + Bid) / 2], and compare this to the quoted half 
spread, calculated as (Ask – Bid) / 2, for the 20 Star stocks in the 12 months 
after the structural change.  I also calculate the effective percentage half spread 
as [Transaction Price – (Ask + Bid) / 2] / (Ask + Bid) / 2, and compare this to 
the proportional quoted half spread calculated as [(Ask – Bid) / 2] / (Ask + Bid) 
/ 2, again for the 20 Star stocks.  The results are presented in Table 4-9. 
 96 
 
 
Table 4-8 
Control with the New Market 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics, including quoted and proportional spread, turnover and volatility (Panel A) and 
regression results (Panel B) for Star and New Market stocks.  Star stocks are included if they traded continuously for 12 
months prior to and after the 2 April, 2001 structural change, while New Market stocks traded continuously for six months 
prior to and after the change.  For each variable, the table reports the mean, median (in parentheses) and change in mean for 
the six months around the structural change.  Statistical significance emanates from the test of whether the mean change is 
significantly different from zero.  In the regressions, the dependant variable is measured as the quoted euro spread for the 
Star stocks in the first and third regressions, while it is measured as the proportional quoted spread in the second and fourth 
regressions.  The change dummy variable takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise.  The New 
Market spread variable is the quoted euro spread for the first regression, and the proportional quoted spread for the second 
regression.  The third and fourth regressions include the natural logarithm of the euro turnover and percentage volatility for 
Star and New Market stocks.  All variables are calculated using data from six months around the structural change.  For 
each regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-squared values are reported.  
 
A.  
Descriptive 
statistics 
 
Mean before 
(Median before) 
Mean after 
(Median after) Mean change 
Quoted  
spread (€)  
0.434 
(0.41) 
0.284 
(0.27) -0.150** 
Proportional 
spread (%)  
0.5342 
(0.4971) 
0.6136 
(0.5868) 0.0794 
Turnover (€)  1,131,166 (851,067) 
1,167,845 
(792,485) 36,679 
Volatility (%)  3.918 (3.657) 
4.172 
(4.078) 0.2540 
 97 
 
 
 
Table 4-8, continued 
 
B.  
Regressions  Intercept Change 
 
New Market 
spread 
 
New Market 
turnover  
ln(€) 
New Market 
volatility  
(%) 
Star turnover 
ln(€) 
Star volatility 
(%) Adj. R
2
 
Star quoted 
spread (€)  0.0496** -0.0078* 0.0283*     0.1527 
Star 
proportional 
spread (%) 
 0.0089** -0.0018** 0.4039**     0.3115 
Star quoted 
spread (€)  0.0893* -0.0061* -- -0.0012 0.2228 -0.0041 1.108** 0.2658 
Star 
proportional 
spread (%) 
 0.0050** -0.0010** -- -0.0007 0.0123 -0.0006 0.2424** 0.4639 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
     * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
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The comparison of the quoted half spread with the effective half spread 
indicates that effective spreads are lower than quoted spreads.  The half spread 
averages €0.022, while the effective spread averages €0.018.  The difference of 
€0.0034 is significantly different from zero.  Percentage spread results are 
consistent.  The difference between proportional and effective spreads of 0.0863 
percent is significantly different from zero.  Thus the specialist’s ability to offer 
price improvement over the best quotes provides an even lower cost of trading 
than was attainable in the auction market.13 
 
 
Table 4-9 
Effective Spreads 
 
This table reports quoted and effective half spreads (both euro and percentage) 
for the 20 stocks that moved from an auction market to the Star specialist 
market.  Stocks are included if they traded continuously for 12 months prior to 
and after the 2 April, 2001 structural change.  For each measure, the mean, 
median and mean difference is reported.  Statistical significance emanates from 
the test of whether the mean difference between the effective and quoted spread 
is different from zero. 
 
  Half spreads (€)  Half spreads (%) 
  Quoted Effective  Quoted Effective 
Mean  0.022 0.018  0.5537 0.4674 
Median  0.014 0.009  0.4380 0.3114 
Mean difference  -0.004**  -0.0863** 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
     * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
                                                 
13
 I also compare effective and quoted spreads using three and six month event windows after the structural 
change.  The results from this are consistent with the 12 month results. 
 99 
4.6 Summary 
 
Several studies have compared the differences in bid-ask spreads for stocks 
listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq.  On 2 April, 2001, a structural change was 
implemented on the Italian Bourse.  Many stocks that traded in an auction 
market switched to a specialist market (Star), while other stocks remained in an 
auction market (SBO).  This provides a ‘natural’ experiment where the impact 
of a specialist on the bid-ask spread can be ascertained. 
 
Results indicate that spreads tighten when stocks move from an auction market 
to a specialist market, although trading activity is slightly reduced.  After 
controlling for the bid-ask spread, the turnover and the volatility in the SBO and 
Star markets, both the quoted and proportional Star spreads exhibit considerable 
reductions after the structural change.  The first hypothesis that bid-ask spreads 
are lower under a specialist market structure is thus accepted.  However, the 
second hypothesis that trading activity will increase with specialist intervention 
is rejected. 
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4.7 Appendix 
 
Table 4-10 
Ticker Symbols for Star and SBO Stocks 
 
This table lists the ticker symbols for the 20 stocks that switched to the Star 
market on 2 April, 2001 (Panel A) and the 57 stocks which remained in the 
ordinary SBO market (Panel B). 
 
Panel A: Star stocks 
AMG CMB IMA MRT RG 
BFE CRM IP NM RM 
BRE CSP JH PEL SG 
CEM DMH LD PIN STEF 
Panel B: SBO stocks 
ACS ENR IZ RIC TFI 
ARN FDP MCL RON VEM 
ASR GC MF SAD VIN 
B GEM MFNC SCH VLA 
BAN GI MON SIT ZUC 
BDB GNV OLI SMI  
BE IFP PAG SMU  
BRI IGV PF SN  
CARR IML PINF SNA  
CLE IMS PMS SOL  
COF IPG POL SPF  
CRA ITH PRO SPO  
DAN ITK RAT SSL  
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Chapter 5: The Intraday Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads 
Across Auction and Specialist Market Structures 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes the intraday pattern in bid-ask spreads for Star stocks on 
the Italian Bourse.  The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 highlighted the many 
studies that have analyzed spreads across the trading day, and have documented 
a U-shaped intraday pattern.  This phenomenon has been attributed to inventory 
holding costs, specialist market power and adverse selection risk.  However, the 
hybrid nature of trading on the NYSE (which combines a specialist with a limit 
order book) makes it difficult to determine the exact nature of spreads dictated 
by a specialist.  The stocks that switched from an auction to a specialist market 
on the Italian Bourse thus provide a natural experiment to compare intraday 
spreads across the two market structures.  
 
Based on this and the literature in Section 2.2.2, two hypotheses were 
developed, which will be subsequently tested in this Chapter.  The first 
hypothesis conjectures that volume, volatility and spreads will exhibit the U-
shaped intraday pattern documented in previous research.  The second 
hypothesis conjectures that the specialist will use their market powers to 
consistently charge higher prices. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 5.2 describes the 
dataset and subsequent sample used.  Section 5.3 sets out the research design, 
Section 5.4 presents the empirical results, while Section 5.5 reports several 
additional tests. Section 5.6 summarizes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Data and Sample 
 
As with the previous chapter, I identify firms that were listed on the original 
market structure (liquid and less liquid securities), and moved to one of the 
three new segments (Blue Chip, SBO or Star).  To control for major differences 
in liquidity and firm size, several stocks are automatically excluded from the 
sample.  Stocks that traded as less liquid securities, or stocks that moved to the 
Blue Chip segment, are not considered.14  From the remaining stocks, I select all 
stocks that traded for at least 12 months prior to and after the structural change.  
This leaves a total of 77 stocks.  Of these 77 stocks, 57 continued trading in the 
ordinary auction market (SBO market), while 20 commenced trading in the new 
Star market.15 
 
For these 20 Star stocks, the data includes the time (to the nearest second), price 
and volume for each trade, and the time and price of each bid and ask quote 
posted.  The data extends from one year before to one year after the 2 April, 
2001 structural change.  Also included are daily high and low prices and daily 
                                                 
14
 Also excluded are foreign listed companies. 
15
 A list of all Star ticker symbols is provided in Section 4.7. 
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turnover for each stock.  Market capitalization of all 20 firms on the trading day 
prior to the structural change is also available.  The data is sourced from a 
Reuters database. 
 
Table 5-1 provides summary statistics for the 20 Star stocks included in the 
sample.  The average proportional spread prior to the structural change is 0.627 
percent, whilst after the change the average has risen to 0.665 percent.  The 
average price has fallen, from €5.03 before to €4.16 after.  Average daily 
volume prior to 2 April, 2001 is 111,612 shares, whilst after the event date the 
average has fallen to 94,034 shares.  The reduction in price and volume has lead 
to a reduction in average daily turnover, from €555,827 to €363,457.  Average 
daily volatility, calculated as the log difference between the high price and low 
price on each trading day, has also fallen after the switch, from 2.810 percent to 
2.654 percent.  The average market capitalization on the trading day prior to the 
structural change is €296.9 million.  
 
5.3 Research Design 
 
 
To analyze the intraday behavior of bid-ask spreads and to test the first 
hypothesis for this chapter (H5,1), I partition each trading day into 32 15-minute 
intervals.16  Following the leads of both McInish and Wood (1992) and Chan, 
Chung and Johnson (1995), I calculate time-weighted absolute bid-ask spreads 
                                                 
16
 Same partitioning as used by Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995).  
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in each time interval.  The weighting method is based on the number of seconds 
the quotation is outstanding during the 15-minute interval.  I also calculate the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread at the end of each 15-minute interval.  The 
volatility for each 15-minute interval is calculated as the absolute midpoint-to-
midpoint stock return.  The use of quote midpoints is motivated by Chan, 
Chung and Johnson (1995) who claim that the use of transaction prices is noisy 
due to bid-ask bounce.  Volume is simply the total number of shares transacted 
in each 15-minute interval. 
 
 
It is possible that bid and ask quotes that are entered are unrealistic in that a 
trade is not likely to eventuate unless better quotes are entered.  Also, under the 
specialist market structure, the specialist can offer price improvement within the 
best quotes, which will not be captured in the time-weighted bid-ask spread.  If 
the specialist continually offers price improvement, then the ‘real’ cost of 
trading is significantly lower than is captured with the time-weighted method.  
To capture the effective cost of trading, I include only bid-ask spreads that lead 
directly to trades.  Essentially this involves using the bid-ask spread 
immediately prior to each transaction.17  Thus for each 15-minute interval, I 
calculate the volume-weighted effective percentage half spread as [Transaction 
Price – (Ask + Bid) / 2] / (Ask + Bid) / 2.18   
 
                                                 
17
 Bessembinder (2003) and Peterson and Sirri (2003) show that estimates are least biased when measured using 
contemporaneous bid-ask quotes. 
18
 During the pre-period in which Star stocks traded in an auction market, the effective percentage spread is 
equal to the proportional bid-ask spread as no transactions occurred within the quotes. 
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Table 5-1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics (number of stocks, proportional spread, 
closing price, daily volume, daily turnover, daily volatility and market 
capitalization) for the 20 Star stocks.  Stocks are included if they traded 
continuously 12 months prior to and after the 2 April, 2001 structural change.  
Volatility is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of daily high to low 
stock prices.  For each variable, the table reports the mean and median for the 
12 months before and after the structural change. Market capitalization is 
calculated on the trading day prior to the structural change. 
 
 Star market 
 Before After 
Number of stocks 20 
Time-Weighted spread (%)   
 Mean 0.627 0.665 
 Median 0.581 0.643 
Closing price (€)   
 Mean 5.03 4.16 
 Median 4.47 3.53 
Daily volume (shares)   
 Mean 111,612 94,034 
 Median 107,328 89,034 
Daily turnover (€)   
 Mean 555,827 363,457 
 Median 422,429 319,842 
Daily volatility (%)   
 Mean 2.810 2.654 
 Median 2.730 2.493 
Market capitalization (€ million)   
 Mean 296.9 
 Median 258.8 
 
To control for variations in bid-ask spreads across the day caused by variations 
in volume and volatility, the following two linear regressions are estimated: 
 
∑∑
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In the first regression, tBAS represents the time-weighted bid-ask spread in each 
15-minute interval, while in the second regression, tEBAS  represents the 
volume-weighted effective percentage half spread in each 15-minute interval.  
The volume variable is the natural logarithm of the number of shares transacted 
in each 15-minute interval.  The volatility variable, tVol , is the absolute 
midpoint-to-midpoint stock return for each 15-minute interval.  The volume 
variable, tVolume , is the total number of shares transacted in each 15 minute 
interval.  Following the lead of McInish and Wood (1992), I include four 
dummy variables, dDay , that equal one if the observations occur on Tuesday, 
Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday respectively, zero otherwise.  This should 
capture any day-of-the-week effects. 
 
To analyze the intraday behavior of the specialist with regards to the bid-ask 
spread relative to the spreads under an auction market, and thus to test the 
second hypothesis for this chapter (H5,2), I include 32 time-interval dummy 
variables for the entire two-year period.  For example, if an observation falls 
into the first 15-minute interval and occurred after the 2 April, 2001 structural 
change, then the D1 dummy variable takes the value of one, zero otherwise.  
Thus if D1 is negative, then the bid-ask spread is significantly lower in the first 
15-minute interval under the specialist market structure.  As the trading day is 
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longer under the specialist market structure (there are an additional three 15-
minute intervals), I exclude the middle three 15-minute intervals from the 
specialist structure period.   
 
5.4 Empirical Results   
 
5.4.1 Intraday Pattern Results 
 
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 present results for volume, volatility, time-weighted bid-ask 
spread and the volume-weighted effective percentage half spread in each 15-
minute interval of the trading day for the 12 months before and after the 2 April, 
2001 structural change.  First, volume shows a U-shaped pattern both before 
and after the structural change, consistent with the findings of McInish and 
Wood (1992) and Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995).  Volume is lower in each 
15-minute interval after the structural change (which is consistent with the 
findings in the previous chapter).  This U-shaped pattern, and the differences 
between the before and after periods, are also evident in Figure 5-1.   
 
Secondly, return volatility is highest at the start of the trading day, both before 
and after the structural change.  However, unlike with Chan, Chung and 
Johnson (1995), volatility does not begin to rise again at the end of the trading 
day.  Interestingly, there is a spike in volatility around 3 p.m. under the 
specialist market structure, which lasts approximately 30 minutes, and then 
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reverts back to prior levels.  The spike and lack of U-shaped pattern is clearly 
illustrated in Figure 5-2. 
 
Table 5-2 
Intraday Patterns Prior to Structural Change 
 
This table reports the mean values for volume, volatility, time-weighted 
percentage bid-ask spread (TWBAS) and volume-weighted effective percentage 
half spread (EBAS) in each 15-minute interval of the trading day for the 20 Star 
stocks prior to the 2001 structural change. Stocks are included if they traded 
continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural change. 
 
Time Volume Volatility TWBAS (%) EBAS (%) 
9:30AM  1965 0.0053 1.497 0.5931 
9:45AM  1961 0.0055 1.258 0.4978 
10:00AM  2067 0.0061 1.139 0.3899 
10:15AM  2005 0.0052 1.070 0.3464 
10:30AM  2029 0.0043 1.022 0.3425 
10:45AM  2018 0.0033 0.9853 0.3244 
11:00AM  2087 0.0032 0.9507 0.3217 
11:15AM  2032 0.0034 0.9208 0.3105 
11:30AM  1949 0.0028 0.9017 0.3050 
11:45AM  2092 0.0031 0.8833 0.2972 
12:00PM  1957 0.0026 0.8718 0.2889 
12:15PM  1992 0.0029 0.8724 0.2912 
12:30PM  1948 0.0026 0.8518 0.2982 
12:45PM  1928 0.0024 0.8342 0.2804 
1:00PM  1854 0.0025 0.8236 0.2851 
1:15PM  1841 0.0025 0.8108 0.2771 
1:30PM  1764 0.0026 0.8075 0.2847 
1:45PM  1456 0.0027 0.8037 0.2756 
2:00PM  1122 0.0023 0.8008 0.2905 
2:15PM  1338 0.0025 0.8012 0.2884 
2:30PM  1337 0.0025 0.803 0.3429 
2:45PM  1735 0.0024 0.7919 0.2840 
3:00PM  1982 0.0024 0.7886 0.2776 
3:15PM  2029 0.0024 0.7897 0.2761 
3:30PM  2050 0.0027 0.7909 0.2738 
3:45PM  2165 0.0026 0.7916 0.2741 
4:00PM  2160 0.0025 0.795 0.2731 
4:15PM  2301 0.0026 0.7924 0.2763 
4:30PM  2271 0.0024 0.8023 0.2780 
4:45PM  2376 0.0029 0.8062 0.2841 
5:00PM  2430 0.0025 0.8224 0.2926 
5:15PM  2737 0.0026 0.8616 0.2961 
5:30PM  2697 0.0025 0.9880 0.3329 
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   Table 5-3 
Intraday Patterns After the Structural Change 
 
This table reports the mean values for volume, volatility, time-weighted 
percentage bid-ask spread (TWBAS) and volume-weighted effective percentage 
half spread (EBAS) in each 15-minute interval of the trading day for the 20 Star 
stocks after the 2001 structural change. Stocks are included if they traded 
continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural change. 
 
Time Volume Volatility TWBAS (%) EBAS (%) 
9:30AM  1761 0.0070 1.483 0.5846 
9:45AM  1705 0.0067 1.325 0.4545 
10:00AM  1272 0.0044 1.235 0.3795 
10:15AM  1312 0.0036 1.184 0.3468 
10:30AM  1326 0.0040 1.138 0.3261 
10:45AM  1329 0.0030 1.093 0.3352 
11:00AM  1257 0.0037 1.061 0.3221 
11:15AM  1215 0.0037 1.065 0.3151 
11:30AM  1296 0.0041 1.039 0.3207 
11:45AM  1278 0.0030 1.026 0.3135 
12:00PM  1296 0.0028 1.013 0.3229 
12:15PM  1316 0.0033 0.9943 0.3182 
12:30PM  1220 0.0031 0.9865 0.3134 
12:45PM  1285 0.0034 0.9843 0.3125 
1:00PM  1191 0.0032 0.9730 0.3133 
1:15PM  1178 0.0031 0.9648 0.3156 
1:30PM  986 0.0026 0.9564 0.2855 
1:45PM  840 0.0021 0.9499 0.2483 
2:00PM  741 0.0017 0.9447 0.2279 
2:15PM  820 0.0018 0.9403 0.2201 
2:30PM  884 0.0019 0.9283 0.4537 
2:45PM  1082 0.0024 0.9221 0.2781 
3:00PM  1282 0.0043 0.9202 0.3011 
3:15PM  1291 0.0028 0.9201 0.2914 
3:30PM  1368 0.0026 0.9157 0.2956 
3:45PM  1371 0.0026 0.9155 0.3063 
4:00PM  1403 0.0024 0.9206 0.2970 
4:15PM  1563 0.0024 0.9375 0.3027 
4:30PM  1519 0.0028 0.9473 0.3072 
4:45PM  1524 0.0025 0.9445 0.3155 
5:00PM  1797 0.0024 0.9460 0.3078 
5:15PM  1769 0.0027 0.9692 0.3263 
5:30PM  2112 0.0027 0.8603 0.3978 
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Figure 5-1 
Volume Across the Trading Day 
 
This figure depicts the average volume for each 15 minute interval across the 
trading day for the 20 stocks that moved from the auction market to the Star 
market on 2 April, 2001. 
 
Figure 5-2 
Volatility Across the Trading Day 
 
This figure depicts the average volatility for each 15 minute interval across the 
trading day for the 20 stocks that moved from the auction market to the Star 
market on 2 April, 2001.  
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Turning attention to bid-ask spreads, time-weighted spreads for the Star stocks 
prior to the structural change exhibit a definite U-shaped pattern.  Spreads are 
wider at the start of the trading day, tighten throughout the day, and begin to 
widen towards the end of the day.  The time-weighted spread pattern after the 
structural change commences in a similar fashion with spreads widest at the 
open.  However, time-weighted spreads in the final 15-minutes of trading are 
tighter than in any other 15-minute interval in the trading day.  This drop in 
spreads towards the close of trading is also visible in Figure 5-3.  Overall, apart 
from the final 15-minute interval, spreads are tighter under an auction rather 
than specialist market structure. 
 
Figure 5-3 
Time-Weighted Proportional Spread Across the Trading Day 
 
This figure depicts the time-weighted proportional spread for each 15 minute 
interval across the trading day for the 20 stocks that moved from the auction 
market to the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  
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Finally, to capture the ‘real’ cost of trading to market participants, the volume-
weighted effective percentage half spread is compared.  Both before and after 
the structural change, the effective spread exhibits a U-shaped intraday pattern.  
Surprisingly, but consistent with the volatility results, there is a spike in spreads 
both before and after the structural change, at around 2:30 p.m.  Figure 5-4 
which presents a graphical depiction of the effective spreads before and after the 
structural change, indicates that effective spreads are lower in the specialist 
market early in the trading day.  However, the effective spread is generally 
higher in the specialist market towards the end of the trading day. 
 
Figure 5-4 
Volume-Weighted Effective Spread Across the Trading Day 
 
This figure depicts the volume-weighted effective percentage half spread for 
each 15 minute interval across the trading day for the 20 stocks that moved from 
the auction market to the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  
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5.4.2 Regression Results 
 
As the intraday results show, both volume and volatility exhibit considerable 
variation after the structural change.  To control for these factors, and to test 
how the specialist behaves throughout the trading day (relative to spreads prior 
to the structural change), the regression described in the previous section is 
estimated.  The results of this are presented in Table 5-4.  Starting with the 
time-weighted bid-ask spread, the volume variable is significantly negative.  
Larger volumes lead to reduced spreads, although the intraday results indicate 
that volume falls after the structural change.   
 
The volatility variable is significantly positive, indicating that increased risk 
leads to wider spreads under both auction and specialist market structures.  The 
day-of-the-week dummy variables are all negative, with Tuesday, Thursday and 
Friday all significantly different from zero.  Spreads are generally higher on 
Monday than on any other day of the week.  Every time-interval dummy 
variable, except for the final 15-minute interval, is significantly positive. 19  
Time-weighted bid-ask spreads are wider throughout the entire trading day 
under the specialist market structure. 
 
The second regression is based on the volume-weighted effective percentage 
half spread.  As with the time-weighted regression results, the volume variable 
                                                 
19
 This finding of smaller spreads in the final 15-minute interval is consistent with the findings of the previous 
chapter, in which the closing spread was shown to be tighter under a specialist market structure. 
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is significantly negative, while the volatility variable is significantly positive.  
All four day-of-the-week variables are insignificantly different from zero.  
Consistent with the finding of McInish and Wood (1992), day-of-the-week 
effects are not robust.  In direct contrast to the time-weighted results, the 
majority of time-interval dummy variables are significantly negative.  Apart 
from the first two 15-minute intervals, and at 2:30 p.m., the effective spreads 
are significantly lower under a specialist market structure. 
 
In summary, the results indicate that the U-shaped intraday pattern in bid-ask 
spreads is relatively constant across both auction and specialist market 
structures.  Trading volume also exhibits the classical U-shaped pattern, both 
before and after the structural change.  Although volatility is at its highest at the 
start of the trading day and falls throughout the day, under both the specialist 
and auction market structures, volatility does not rise towards the close of 
trading.  Overall, the first hypothesis (H5,1) is accepted.  Bid-ask spreads, 
volume and volatility exhibit a U-shaped pattern in both an auction and 
specialist market structure. 
 
 115 
Table 5-4 
Multiple Regression Results 
 
This table reports regression results for the 20 stocks that moved from an 
auction market to the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  Stocks are included if they 
traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural change. In the 
first regression the dependant variable is measured as the time-weighted bid-ask 
spread, while in the second regression it is measured as the volume-weighted 
effective percentage half spread.  Each change dummy variable takes the value 
of one after the structural change, zero otherwise. For each regression, 
coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-squared values are 
reported. 
 
 TWBAS EBAS   TWBAS EBAS 
Intercept 0.7491** 0.4236**  D19 0.2067** -0.1214** 
Volatility 9.803** 0.2706**  D20 0.2164** 0.0347** 
Volume -0.0426** -0.0567**  D21 0.2162** -0.0893** 
D1 0.7399** 0.1069**  D22 0.2329** -0.0819** 
D2 0.5345** 0.0150**  D23 0.2240** -0.0875** 
D3 0.4448** -0.0241**  D24 0.2266** -0.0869** 
D4 0.4057** -0.0361**  D25 0.2377** -0.0815** 
D5 0.3751** -0.0411**  D26 0.2286** -0.0867** 
D6 0.3457** -0.0498**  D27 0.2392** -0.0819** 
D7 0.3146** -0.0593**  D28 0.2496** -0.0794** 
D8 0.3267** -0.0593**  D29 0.2543** -0.0717** 
D9 0.2971** -0.0671**  D30 0.2628** -0.0700** 
D10 0.2964** -0.0655**  D31 0.2825** -0.0581** 
D11 0.2764** -0.0674**  D32 0.3484** -0.0546** 
D12 0.2779** -0.0653**  Tuesday -0.0212** -0.0008 
D13 0.2526** -0.0759**  Wednesday -0.0113 0.0005 
D14 0.2664** -0.0739**  Thursday -0.0207** -0.0007 
D15 0.2553** -0.0862**  Friday -0.0137** -0.0023 
D16 0.2422** -0.1100**  R-squared 0.0981 0.0327 
D18 0.2023** -0.1156**     
            ** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
                 * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
Comparisons of time-weighted bid-ask spreads across the trading day for both 
the auction and specialist market structures provides support for the second 
hypothesis.  The quoted spreads are consistently higher under a specialist 
system.  However, the time-weighted spread does not capture specialist trading 
inside the best quotes.  Comparison of effective spreads before and after the 
structural change indicates that the effective cost of trading is consistently lower 
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under a specialist market structure.  Based on these results, I reject the second 
hypothesis (H5,2).  The specialist does not use his market powers to consistently 
charge higher prices. 
 
5.5 Additional Tests 
 
5.5.1 Effect of Firm Size 
 
Much of the literature has suggested that although specialist markets provide 
lower spreads than dealer markets, the benefit from shifting to a specialist 
market is greater for smaller firms.  As the Italian Bourse already has a segment 
for large firms in excess of €800 million known as “Blue Chips” (which are 
analyzed in Chapter 3), the stocks remaining in the Star market are already 
medium to small capitalization stocks.  To examine the impact of firm size, I 
divide the samples of Star stocks into two groups, as in the previous chapter.  
The intraday analysis around the structural change is then completed separately 
for small and medium capitalization stocks.  The results of this are presented in 
Figure 5-5 and Table 5-5 for small capitalization stocks, and Figure 5-6 and 
Table 5-6 for medium capitalization stocks.20 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Relevant market capitalization and descriptive statistics are identical to those presented in Chapter 4. 
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Table 5-5 
Small Stock Segment 
 
This table reports regression results for small capitalization stocks that moved 
from an auction market to the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  Stocks are included 
if they traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural 
change. In the first regression the dependant variable is measured as the time-
weighted bid-ask spread, while in the second regression it is measured as the 
volume-weighted effective percentage half spread.  Each change dummy 
variable takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise. For 
each regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-
squared values are reported. 
 
 TWBAS EBAS   TWBAS EBAS 
Intercept 0.7498** 0.6238**  D19 0.2045** -0.0692** 
Volatility 9.394** 0.1829**  D20 0.1965** -0.0324** 
Volume -0.0305** -0.0279**  D21 0.2026** -0.0143** 
D1 0.7900** 0.1500**  D22 0.211** -0.0910** 
D2 0.5585** 0.0576**  D23 0.2025** -0.0918** 
D3 0.4652** 0.0021  D24 0.2065** -0.1051** 
D4 0.4266** -0.0055  D25 0.2181** -0.0961** 
D5 0.3876** -0.0168**  D26 0.2038** -0.0961** 
D6 0.3519** -0.0242**  D27 0.2170** -0.0838** 
D7 0.3130** -0.0528**  D28 0.231** -0.0834** 
D8 0.3259** -0.0533**  D29 0.2220** -0.0714** 
D9 0.2884** -0.0648**  D30 0.2334** -0.0695** 
D10 0.2959** -0.0749**  D31 0.2617** -0.0599** 
D11 0.2545** -0.0679**  D32 0.3521** -0.0003 
D12 0.2692** -0.0512**  Tuesday -0.0194** 0.0025 
D13 0.2325** -0.0713**  Wednesday -0.0103 0.0008 
D14 0.2576** -0.0408**  Thursday -0.0032 0.0026 
D15 0.2384** -0.1178**  Friday 0.0040 -0.0019 
D16 0.2254** 0.0103  R-squared 0.1036 0.0533 
D18 0.1878** -0.0623**     
                 **Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
                 *Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
 
 
The intraday pattern in spreads for the small and medium capitalization stocks is 
similar to the full sample results.  The time-weighted spreads prior to the 
structural change exhibit the classical U-shaped pattern.  The pattern is similar 
to the specialist market, except for the final 15-minute interval which 
experiences a drop in spreads.  The effective spreads also exhibit a U-shaped 
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pattern, except for a period in the middle of the trading day for the small 
capitalization stocks which has considerable volatility, both before and after the 
structural change.   
 
Figure 5-5 
Intraday Spread Patterns for Small Capitalization Stocks 
 
This figure depicts the time-weighted proportional spread and volume-weighted 
effective percentage half spread for each 15 minute interval across the trading 
day for the small capitalization stocks that moved from the auction market to 
the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
The regression results for the time-weighted spread are consistent with the 
aggregated results (spreads are wider throughout the trading day with the 
specialist), whilst the effective spread regressions show that the effective cost of 
trading is lower with a specialist, except for the first two 15-minute intervals.  
Volume, volatility and day-of-the-week dummy variables provide consistent 
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results.  Overall, the reduced cost of trading under a specialist market structure 
is not dependant on firm size. 
 
 
Table 5-6 
Medium Stock Segment 
 
This table reports regression results for medium capitalization stocks that 
moved from an auction market to the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  Stocks are 
included if they traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after the 
structural change. In the first regression the dependant variable is measured as 
the time-weighted bid-ask spread, while in the second regression it is measured 
as the volume-weighted effective percentage half spread.  Each change dummy 
variable takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise. For 
each regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-
squared values are reported. 
 
 TWBAS EBAS   TWBAS EBAS 
Intercept 0.5504** 0.2476**  D19 0.1977** -0.0467** 
Volatility 0.4650** 1.532**  D20 0.2182** -0.0424** 
Volume -0.0271** -0.0035**  D21 0.2125** -0.0278** 
D1 0.6410** 0.1195**  D22 0.2245** -0.0330** 
D2 0.4760** 0.0341**  D23 0.2164** -0.0368** 
D3 0.3880** 0.0075  D24 0.2227** -0.0358** 
D4 0.3457** -0.0035  D25 0.2268** -0.0352** 
D5 0.3265** -0.0085  D26 0.2215** -0.0412** 
D6 0.3037** -0.0153**  D27 0.2286** -0.0367** 
D7 0.2845** -0.0153**  D28 0.2333** -0.0346** 
D8 0.2871** -0.0193**  D29 0.2584** -0.0155** 
D9 0.2688** -0.0211**  D30 0.2642** -0.0188** 
D10 0.2616** -0.0260**  D31 0.2756** -0.0073 
D11 0.2673** -0.0294**  D32 0.2974** -0.0338** 
D12 0.2607** -0.0236**  Tuesday -0.0114 0.0053 
D13 0.2402** -0.0341**  Wednesday 0.0016 -0.0013 
D14 0.2425** -0.0291**  Thursday -0.0225* 0.0003 
D15 0.2412** -0.0351**  Friday -0.0053 0.0048 
D16 0.2323** -0.0362**  R-square 0.0691 0.0245 
D18 0.1979** -0.0385**     
                 ** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
                   * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 
Figure 5-6 
Intraday Spread Patterns for Medium Capitalization Stocks 
 
This figure depicts the time-weighted proportional spread and volume-weighted 
effective percentage half spread for each 15 minute interval across the trading 
day for the medium capitalization stocks that moved from the auction market to 
the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  
 
 
 
5.5.2 Length of Event Window 
 
Following the lead of the previous chapter, I examine the sensitivity of results to 
the length of the event window.  As a 12 month pre- and post- event window 
could include significant variation in turnover and volatility, I repeat the 
analysis for both three and six months before and after the structural change.  
The results are presented in Figure 5-7 and Table 5-7 (three month window) and 
Figure 5-8 and Table 5-8 (six month window). 
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The intraday pattern in spreads for the three and six month event windows are 
very similar to the 12 month results.  The time-weighted spreads prior to the 
structural change exhibit the classical U-shaped pattern.  The pattern is similar 
under a specialist system, except for the final 15-minute interval which 
experiences a reduction in spreads.  The effective spreads also exhibit a U-
shaped pattern, except for a period in the middle of the trading day for both the 
three and six month event windows, which exhibit considerable volatility, both 
before and after the structural change. 
 
The regression results are consistent with the 12 month results.  Volume is 
negatively related, volatility is positively related, while day-of-the-week dummy 
variables are generally irrelevant.  Time-weighted spreads are higher throughout 
the trading day with the specialist, whilst effective spreads are lower with a 
specialist except for the first two 15-minute intervals.  Overall, the reduced cost 
of trading under a specialist market structure is robust to the event window in 
which relevant variables are measured. 
 
5.5.3 Intraday Spreads for SBO Stocks 
 
Although findings in the previous section indicate that the cost of trading is 
lower under a specialist market structure, it could be that market wide forces are 
driving this reduced cost.  I thus repeat the analysis using the 57 stocks which 
remained in the SBO auction market.  As both the before and after period is 
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based on an order-driven environment and no trading takes place within the 
quotes, analysis is restricted to time-weighted bid-ask spreads.  The results are 
presented in Figure 5-9 and Table 5-9. 
 
Table 5-7 
Three Month Event Window 
 
This table reports regression results for the 20 stocks that moved from an 
auction market to the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  Stocks are included if they 
traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural change.  All 
variables are calculated using data from three months before and after the 
structural change.  In the first regression the dependant variable is measured as 
the time-weighted bid-ask spread, while in the second regression it is measured 
as the volume-weighted effective percentage half spread.  Each change dummy 
variable takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise. For 
each regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-
squared values are reported. 
 
 TWBAS EBAS   TWBAS EBAS 
Intercept 0.9020** 0.5138**  D19 -0.1588** -0.1706** 
Volatility 0.3600** 0.4318*  D20 -0.1676** -0.1755** 
Volume -0.0020** 0.0001**  D21 -0.2104** -0.2126** 
D1 -0.0325** -0.0410**  D22 -0.2079** -0.2120** 
D2 -0.1330** -0.1341**  D23 -0.2189** -0.2264** 
D3 -0.1698** -0.1722**  D24 -0.2167** -0.2198** 
D4 -0.1631** -0.1656**  D25 -0.2194** -0.2225** 
D5 -0.1869** -0.1902**  D26 -0.2281** -0.2317** 
D6 -0.1845** -0.1892**  D27 -0.2226** -0.2240** 
D7 -0.2021** -0.2083**  D28 -0.2173** -0.2187** 
D8 -0.1992** -0.1981**  D29 -0.2154** -0.2180** 
D9 -0.2136** -0.2139**  D30 -0.2182** -0.2188** 
D10 -0.2010** -0.2045**  D31 -0.2125** -0.2153** 
D11 -0.2087** -0.2109**  D32 -0.1607** -0.1550** 
D12 -0.2016** -0.2033**  Tuesday 0.0052 0.0032 
D13 -0.2057** -0.2085**  Wednesday -0.0030 -0.0033 
D14 -0.1971** -0.2064**  Thursday -0.0008 -0.0016 
D15 -0.2111** -0.2143**  Friday -0.0044 -0.0058* 
D16 -0.1976** -0.2091**  R-square 0.0440 0.0405 
D18 -0.2038** -0.2091**     
                 ** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
                   * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 5-7 
Intraday Spread Patterns for Three Month Event Window 
 
This figure depicts the time-weighted proportional spread and volume-weighted 
effective percentage half spread for each 15 minute interval across the trading 
day for the 20 stocks that moved from the auction market to the Star market on 
2 April, 2001.  All spreads are calculated using data from three months before 
and after the structural change. 
 
 
 
The time-weighted intraday spread pattern exhibits the classical U-shaped 
pattern, with spreads wider at the start and end of the trading day.  Overall, the 
plot of spreads after the 2001 structural change indicates that spreads have 
increased rather than decreased.  The regression results confirm the negative 
relationship with volume and the positive relationship with volatility.  The four 
day-of-the-week dummy variables are all insignificantly different from zero, 
confirming the lack of any day-of-the-week effects.  The time-interval dummy 
variables are generally positive for the early part of the trading day, indicating 
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that spreads are higher after the structural change.  However, dummy variables 
for the middle to later parts of trading are generally negative (and often 
insignificantly different from zero), indicating minimal difference in spreads 
before and after the structural change.  Overall, the reduced cost of trading for 
Star stocks under the specialist system is not driven by market wide events. 
 
 
Table 5-8 
Six Month Event Window 
 
This table reports regression results for the 20 stocks that moved from an 
auction market to the Star market on 2 April, 2001.  Stocks are included if they 
traded continuously for 12 months prior to and after the structural change.  All 
variables are calculated using data from six months before and after the 
structural change.  In the first regression the dependant variable is measured as 
the time-weighted bid-ask spread, while in the second regression it is measured 
as the volume-weighted effective percentage half spread.  Each change dummy 
variable takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise. For 
each regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-
squared values are reported. 
 
 TWBAS EBAS   TWBAS EBAS 
Intercept 1.018** 0.4023**  D19 -0.0858** 0.1231** 
Volatility 18.29** 0.2077**  D20 -0.0858** 0.0517** 
volume -0.0020** -0.0011**  D21 -0.0834** -0.0611** 
D1 0.5473** 0.0905**  D22 -0.0916** -0.0961** 
D2 0.3525** -0.0196**  D23 -0.0938** -0.1112** 
D3 0.2459** -0.0607**  D24 -0.0898** -0.1116** 
D4 0.1810** -0.0664**  D25 -0.0911** -0.1080** 
D5 0.1360** -0.0773**  D26 -0.0877** -0.1086** 
D6 0.0885** -0.0608**  D27 -0.0736** -0.1066** 
D7 0.0480** -0.0753**  D28 -0.0635** -0.1068** 
D8 0.0521** -0.0726**  D29 -0.0586** -0.0843** 
D9 0.0255 -0.0812**  D30 -0.0491** -0.0860** 
D10 0.0097 -0.0756**  D31 -0.0437** -0.0767** 
D11 -0.0028 -0.0791**  D32 -0.0354** -0.0223** 
D12 -0.0071 -0.0687**  Tuesday 0.0043 0.0014 
D13 -0.0199 -0.0914**  Wednesday -0.0130 0.0016 
D14 -0.0368** -0.0839**  Thursday -0.0297** 0.0022 
D15 -0.0514** -0.0775**  Friday -0.0054 0.0002 
D16 -0.0679 -0.1243**  R-square 0.0470 0.0315 
D18 -0.0909** -0.0171**     
                 ** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
                   * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 5-8 
Intraday Spread Patterns for Six Month Event Window 
 
This figure depicts the time-weighted proportional spread and volume-weighted 
effective percentage half spread for each 15 minute interval across the trading 
day for the 20 stocks that moved from the auction market to the Star market on 
2 April, 2001.  All spreads are calculated using data from six months before and 
after the structural change. 
 
Figure 5-9 
Intraday Spread Patterns for SBO Stocks 
 
This figure depicts the time-weighted proportional spread for each 15 minute 
interval across the trading day for the 57 stocks that remained in the ordinary 
SBO auction market. 
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Table 5-9 
SBO Stock Analysis 
 
This table reports regression results for the 57 stocks that remained in the 
ordinary SBO auction market.  Stocks are included if they traded continuously 
for 12 months prior to and after the structural change.  The dependant variable is 
measured as the time-weighted bid-ask spread.  Each change dummy variable 
takes the value of one after the structural change, zero otherwise. For each 
regression, coefficient estimates, statistical significance and adjusted R-squared 
values are reported. 
 
 TWBAS   TWBAS 
Intercept 1.173**  D19 -0.0796** 
Volatility 3.997**  D20 -0.0885** 
Volume -0.0598**  D21 -0.0635** 
D1 0.6519**  D22 -0.0265* 
D2 0.3722**  D23 -0.0210* 
D3 0.2770**  D24 -0.0101 
D4 0.2201**  D25 -0.0147 
D5 0.1681**  D26 -0.0031 
D6 0.1284**  D27 -0.0045 
D7 0.1035**  D28 -0.0023 
D8 0.0843**  D29 -0.0112 
D9 0.0677**  D30 -0.0027 
D10 0.0449**  D31 0.0045 
D11 0.0437**  D32 0.1002** 
D12 0.0383**  Tuesday 0.0249 
D13 0.0292**  Wednesday 0.0002 
D14 0.0136  Thursday -0.0041 
D15 -0.0027  Friday -0.0010 
D16 -0.0186  R-square 0.0981 
D18 -0.0863**    
                                       ** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
                                         * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
Intraday analysis of bid-ask spreads has generally shown that spreads exhibit a 
U-shaped intraday pattern.  Spreads are widest at the open, fall throughout the 
day, and then begin to rise towards the close of trading.  On 2 April, 2001, a 
structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse.  Many stocks that 
traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market (Star), while other 
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stocks remained in an auction market (SBO).  This switch from an auction to a 
specialist market provides a ‘natural’ experiment where the intraday patterns in 
spreads can be directly compared across auction and specialist market 
structures.  It also allows the evaluation of how a specialist uses his market 
power across the trading day. 
 
Results indicate that volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads exhibit a U-shaped 
pattern across the trading day, both before and after the structural change.  
While the time-weighted bid-ask spread is wider with a specialist, comparing 
effective spreads across the trading day confirms that the cost of trading to 
market participants is significantly lower under a specialist market structure.  
These findings are robust to the size of the firm, the event window around the 
structural change and overall market-wide changes.  Based on these results, the 
first hypothesis which conjectures that volume, volatility and spreads exhibit U-
shaped patterns is accepted.  However, the second hypothesis which conjectures 
that specialists use their market powers to consistently charge higher prices is 
rejected. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
This dissertation brings further evidence to bear on the liquidity of various 
market structures.  The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 highlights a number of 
gaps in the existing literature.  The analysis of liquidity surrounding earnings 
announcements has generally produced inconclusive evidence.  This may be 
attributed to the hybrid nature of trading in US markets, where the specialist’s 
or dealer’s impact on the bid-ask spread cannot be directly ascertained.  
Extending this, the interaction between the specialist and the limit order book 
on the NYSE make comparing bid-ask spreads across market structures 
ambiguous.  Finally, this hybrid nature of trading on the NYSE makes 
understanding the intraday pattern of bid-ask spreads, as a result of specialist 
behavior, difficult, if not impossible.  Based on these difficulties in analyzing 
liquidity, this dissertation presents three essays which bridge gaps in the 
literature. 
 
The first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 3) analyzes bid-ask spreads around 
earnings announcements on the Italian Bourse.  This chapter provides new 
evidence that bid-ask spreads increase significantly surrounding earnings 
announcements, in contrast to prior evidence from US markets which is 
inconclusive.  The use of bid-ask spreads from a purely order-driven 
environment mitigates the problems inherent in prior studies that use dealer 
spreads, enabling a cleaner test of information asymmetry surrounding earnings 
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announcements.  The results are consistent with an increase in information 
surrounding earnings announcements, suggesting that private and public 
information are complements. 
 
The second essay of this dissertation (Chapter 4) analyzes bid-ask spreads 
across specialist and auction market structures on the Italian Bourse.  Several 
studies have compared the differences in bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the 
NYSE and Nasdaq.  The majority of these studies show that the cost of 
executing trades is lower on the NYSE.  However, the nature of trading on the 
NYSE is ambiguous, sometimes referred to as an auction market and other 
times a specialist market.  The existence of a limit order book ‘competing’ with 
the specialist further complicates the comparison of spreads with other market 
structures.   
 
On 2 April, 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse.  
Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market 
(Star), while other stocks remained in an auction market (SBO).  As the Star 
specialist controls, rather than competes with the limit order book, there is a 
‘natural’ experiment where the impact of a specialist’s involvement on the bid-
ask spread can be ascertained. 
 
Results indicate that spreads tighten when stocks move from an auction market 
to a specialist market.  After controlling for the bid-ask spread, the turnover and 
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the volatility in the SBO and Star markets, both the quoted and proportional Star 
spreads exhibit considerable reductions after the structural change.  This 
reduction in spreads is robust to the market capitalization of the stock, the firms’ 
industry affiliation and the event window around the structural change.  Using 
the New Market to control for market wide factors, I confirm the reduction in 
spreads for Star stocks.  The specialist, in allowing price improvement inside 
the best quotes, is further reducing the cost of executing trades.  I conclude that 
bid-ask spreads are tighter with a specialist.  Compared to an auction market, a 
specialist market proves more advantageous to market participants. 
 
The final essay of this dissertation (Chapter 5) analyzes intraday patterns in bid-
ask spreads across specialist and auction market structures on the Italian Bourse.  
Intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads have been extensively studied in finance 
research.  Most of this research has generally shown that spreads exhibit a U-
shaped intraday pattern.  Spreads are widest at the open, fall throughout the day, 
and then begin to rise towards the close of trading.  This pattern has been 
attributed to the inventory holding costs of specialists, the market power of the 
specialist at the open and close of trading, and the adverse selection risk faced 
by market makers.  However, the hybrid nature of trading on the NYSE, which 
incorporates both a specialist and a limit order book, could disguise the actual 
pattern of spreads dictated by a specialist. 
 
 131 
The switch from an auction to a specialist market on the Italian Bourse provides 
a ‘natural’ experiment where the intraday patterns in spreads can be directly 
compared across auction and specialist market structures.  It also allows an 
evaluation of how specialists use their market power across the trading day.  
Results indicate that volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads exhibit a U-shaped 
pattern across the trading day, both before and after the structural change.  
While the time-weighted bid-ask spread is wider with a specialist, comparing 
effective spreads across the trading day confirms that the cost of trading to 
market participants is significantly lower under a specialist market structure.  
These findings are robust to the size of the firm, the event window around the 
structural change and overall market-wide changes. 
 
The three essays and their conclusions outline several potential future research 
directions. To further investigate liquidity surrounding earnings announcements, 
the liquidity ‘market model’ of Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) could 
be used to control for market-wide movements in bid-ask spreads.  The 
evidence provided in the final two essays indicates that the effective cost of 
trading is lower under a specialist market structure.  Analyzing bid-ask spreads 
around earnings announcements to determine how the specialist reacts to an 
increase in adverse information is another possible extension.  Also, 
determining how quickly information is disseminated into the market with 
specialist intervention, compared to a pure order driven environment, is an area 
of significant interest.  In summary, determining the differences between 
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auction, dealer and specialist market structures, and thus which design provides 
market participants the best overall trading experience, is an area of immediate 
practical importance.   
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